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One of the ironies of European business history of the twentieth century is
the relative stability (resiliency) of corporate ownership structures despite
the unprecedented political turmoil with devastating wars and the inter-
regnum of Socialism. It is, however, still impossible to understand the
strong historical path dependence without analyzing how political factors
have profoundly aﬀected the development of corporate ownership by ﬁrst
setting the stage and then changing the conditions in systematic ways
(see, e.g., Roe 2002a,b)—not only through the design of the legal system
(regimes) and corporate laws, and the eﬃciency of legal enforcement and
supervision, but also by changing the balance of interests between labor
and capital by regulation of labor, product and capital markets, and devel-
opment of tax-ﬁnanced public welfare systems with egalitarian ambitions
to redistribute resources and opportunities.
Another historical irony is that previous adversarial relations between
capital and labor have given way to a corporatist society where heavily en-
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cialist Ideal That Tied Up Swedish Riches.”trenched private ownership of the largest listed ﬁrms coexists and cooper-
ates with labor unions whose members enjoy strong employee protection
and are represented on the board (see Pagano and Volpin 2001). Since ﬁ-
nancial markets are conducive to structural changes, which often run
counter to the status quo interests of incumbent labor and capital, they tend
to be less developed in corporatist countries, and ﬁrms also tend to be less
dependent on external ﬁnancing through equity markets (see, e.g., Rajan
and Zingales 2003a). This is particularly true in Continental Europe and in
Scandinavia, where proportional voting systems tend to favor formation of
minority or coalition governments and consensus decision making, which
fosters political rent seeking by the ﬁrms’ stakeholders, and larger public
sectors.1 Corporate ownership in a country therefore rests not only on the
corporate law and on the legal regime but ultimately on the political ac-
ceptance at large of entrenched private ownership. The structure of corpo-
rate ownership and governance, and the development of the ﬁnancial sys-
tem, are thus very much integrated parts of a country’s political history.
But how do the economic, political, legal, and historical conditions in-
teract? The challenge in comparative historical analysis of corporate own-
ership is to try to separate which factors are primarily exogenous and
which are predominantly endogenously determined, and then evaluate
their relative importance and causal relations by comparing the realized
historical paths across countries. History is of course not deterministic,
since the actual equilibrium path is only one of many possible ones, and
temporary random events like ﬁnancial crises and subsequent regulatory
responses may have long-term eﬀects through path dependence (see Rajan
and Zingales 2003b). The underlying assumption is thus that there is
enough structural stability in societies for the comparative analysis to map
out the major decisive factors of corporate ownership over time.
This is of course a very tall order, but fortunately some institutions and
factors (e.g., constitutions, legal regimes and enforcement, economic geo-
graphy) are surprisingly stable over time and therefore natural candidates
as exogenous determinants in the causal historical analysis. Protection
of property rights, freedom of contracting, and the openness of the civic
society have basically been exogenous factors over a longer time period
but have sometimes been exposed to the strong winds of political change.
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1. In a cross-country analysis of the relation between political institutions and policy out-
comes, Persson and Tabellini (2003) ﬁnd that presidential regimes have smaller governments
than parliamentary systems. Majoritarian elections induce smaller governments, less welfare
spending, and smaller deﬁcits than do proportional elections. In particular, they report sys-
tematic diﬀerences in spending patterns: “Proportional and parliamentary democracies
alone display a ratchet eﬀect in spending, with government outlays as a percentage of GDP
rising in recessions, but not reverting in booms. All countries cut taxes in election years. Pres-
idential regimes postpone ﬁscal contractions until after the elections, while parliamentary
regimes do not; welfare-state programs are expanded in the proximity of elections, but only
in democracies with proportional elections.”Changes in external competition and major technological changes are also
primarily exogenous, in particular for a small open market economy, and
often catalysts for structural changes. Other pivotal factors have a much
less exogenous character since they are more inﬂuenced by changing eco-
nomic and political conditions—for example, the domestic economy’s
openness to trade and capital ﬂows and the choice of exchange rate regimes
and policies to promote ﬂexible labor markets and development of ﬁnan-
cial markets. The strongest endogenous factor in the twentieth century has
deﬁnitely been how political ideology (e.g., socialism or egalitarianism) in
general, and the voice of parties and organized stakeholders, in particular
labor, have rallied political support for and implemented policies that ab-
sorb and assuage eﬀects of brute, tempestuous markets forces.
This paper contributes to the comparative historic analysis by analyzing
which factors (economic, legal, historical, and political) were decisive in
the historical development of corporate ownership (listed ﬁrms) in Swe-
den. In fact, Sweden is a rather suitable case for a causal analysis since
several economic factors are exogenously determined by the fact that it isa
small and export-oriented economy that has exploited its base of natural
resources and supplied Europe with raw materials and manufacturing
goods. Institutional and political conditions have also been very stable
since the country beneﬁted politically and economically by staying out of
the two wars. In particular, the political stability has been unprecedented
among Western democracies.
The Social Democratic Party (SAP) has been in power since 1932 ex-
cept for nine years between 1976 and 1982 and between 1991 and 1994 but
predominantly as a single-party minority government with passive sup-
port from the Communist Party (SKP, VPK, and Vänsterpartiet [Socialist
Party]), and more recently also from the Environmental Party (Miljöpar-
tiet) or in coalition or with support from the Farmers’ Party (Bondeför-
bundet, later Centerpartiet). Consistent with the corporatist spirit in soci-
ety, the relation between the well-organized interests of capital and labor
has in general been cooperative and consensus oriented, and property
rights have been respected. The exceptions to this rule are two major po-
litical conﬂicts in the late 1940s (about a far-reaching governmental inter-
ventionist program for a more planned economy to ﬁght an expected post-
war depression) and in the late 1970s and early 1980s (about a proposal for
partial transfer of corporate control to the labor unions), which both re-
sulted in electoral setbacks for the Social Democrats and in implementa-
tion of signiﬁcantly watered-down programs that later were terminated.
Despite recurrent ﬁnancial and industrial crises, and increasing capital
demands, corporate control of the largest ﬁrms has been remarkably stable
and increasingly concentrated since the 1930s. The political intervention
and general inﬂuence in the economy at large has, however, been signiﬁ-
cant, and embodied in an unusually large tax-ﬁnanced public sector that
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tious manner. The mixture of institutional stability, persistent Social De-
mocratic policies, and stable, concentrated corporate ownership in a small
open economy exposed to international competitive pressure makes Swe-
den a particularly interesting case.
I focus on three major questions about the history and politics of cor-
porate ownership. First, given the changing economic and political condi-
tions, which factors caused the ownership of the largest listed ﬁrms to be-
come so concentrated and stable over time? And which are the economic
consequences thereof? Since stability breeds complacency, lock-in of in-
herited capital, and political rent seeking, in particular if ﬁrms are con-
trolled by families and banks, it is important to track the eﬀects on invest-
ments, research and development (R&D), overall growth, and creation of
new ﬁrms; where does the new entrepreneurial blood come from? (See, e.g.,
Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung 2000 and He, Morck, and Yeung 2003.)
Second, the relation between labor and capital has not been without ten-
sion, but why did the very strong egalitarian ambitions of the labor move-
ment (the blue-collar union LO and the Social Democratic Party [SAP])
make a halt at private ownership and accept that the control of the largest
ﬁrms via pyramids and extensive use of dual-class shares rests with a very
small elite of old families and professional managers? Why does one of the
most egalitarian societies accept one of the most unequal distributions of
power over large corporations? Neither lasting inﬂuence of an antithetical
political ideology nor ambitious redesign by occupational powers (Ger-
many and Japan) seems thus to hinder established mechanisms of corpo-
rate control from reproducing (replicating) themselves in democracies. But
why are the control mechanisms so strong that they survive the whirlwinds
of political and social change?
The third question concerns how the structure of the ﬁnancial system
has inﬂuenced and shaped corporate ownership and how ownership in
turn has aﬀected the development of the ﬁnancial system, in particular of
the primary equity markets. The question is of course motivated by the in-
ﬂuential literature on law and ﬁnance that ﬁnds correlations between e.g.
civil law origin dummy (signiﬁcant regression coeﬃcient), more concen-
trated ownership and less developed ﬁnancial markets (see, e.g., La Porta,
López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999 and La Porta et al. 2000). Are there
other factors besides the degree of legal protection of minority sharehold-
ers that explain why ownership did not become dispersed in Sweden? Does,
for example, Mark Roe’s idea that ownership and control do not separate
in Continental Europe because the pressure of social democracy (in a wide
sense, not necessarily a political party) also applies to perhaps the most so-
cial democratic society in Europe, Sweden?
I provide an integrated answer to the three closely related questions by
focusing on a narrow ﬁnancial perspective: how did the ﬁrms ﬁnance their
520 Peter Högfeldtinvestments? Or, more speciﬁcally, how dependent have listed ﬁrms been
on external capital from the primary equity market?2 The importance of
political, social, and external economic factors will be analyzed from the
perspective of how they have inﬂuenced and shaped the ﬁrm’s dependence
on external equity ﬁnancing. The basic idea is that ownership will become
dispersed only if ﬁrms need to raise a signiﬁcant part of their capital in the
external equity markets, and that political decisions will determine how de-
pendent ﬁrms are on external ﬁnancing. Political support for use of pyra-
mids and dual-class shares that separate votes from capital will limit the
controlling owners’ as well as the ﬁrm’s dependence on equity markets.
This occurs because the separation of ownership from control drives a sig-
niﬁcant wedge between the costs of internal and external capital as new ex-
ternal shareholders demand compensation (discounts) for the associated
agency costs. But the ﬁrm’s internal capital is comparatively inexpensive
for the controlling owners, as they have access to and exert power over all
of the ﬁrm’s internal cash ﬂows via a relatively small (less than propor-
tional) capital investment. This generates an enhanced pecking order of ﬁ-
nancing: strong reliance on retained earnings and borrowing but avoid-
ance of equity issues, in particular of large public oﬀers, as they would
dilute control and also be extra costly due to the discounts to new outside
shareholders (see Holmén and Högfeldt 2004b).3 The enhanced pecking
order is reinforced by the key political decision to allow banks to directly
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2. My ideas have been inspired by Rajan and Zingales (2003a,b) and their interest group
theory of ﬁnancial development where incumbents oppose development when it breeds com-
petition. My analysis of the Swedish case may be regarded as an application and elaboration
of their basic framework by its focus on the interaction between political ideology and cor-
porate ownership. Another great inspiration is Mark Roe’s political theory about social
democracy (Roe 2002a) and his views on corporate law and corporate governance (Roe
2002b), although I disagree on some points. My analysis deviates from the interesting ap-
proach to a new political economy surveyed and developed by Pagano and Volpin (2001,
2004), respectively, since I emphasize the importance of political ideology more strongly than
diﬀerences in electoral systems, but their analysis has been thought provoking. Erixon (1997)
has been an important inspiration, and my ﬁnancial approach may be regarded as comple-
mentary to his real analysis of the Swedish industrial development. I have also beneﬁted from
Henrekson and Jakobsson (2001, 2003a,b), who emphasize the negative eﬀect of taxes on cor-
porate ownership and the threat of Socialism to private ownership. But they completely ig-
nore that the existence of pyramids presupposes that intercorporate dividends as well as cap-
ital gains are not taxed; see Morck (2003). Social Democratic governments have over the
years implemented such tax policies that are conducive to pyramiding; see Holmén and
Högfeldt (2004b). Applying Rajan and Zingales’s general reasoning, however, I develop a po-
litical theory of corporate ownership and ﬁnancial markets that generates the diametrically
opposite conclusion. The Social Democrats have been the guarantor rather than the threat to
entrenched corporate ownership since the political and corporate incumbencies have been
united over time by strong common interests. Glete’s (1994) historical description and anal-
ysis of corporate networks have signiﬁcantly contributed to my knowledge and ideas about
corporate ownership in Sweden.
3. The pecking order is enhanced since it is caused by agency costs inherent to the owner-
ship structure and not primarily by asymmetric information costs, and since public oﬀers are
very strongly avoided; see Högfeldt and Oborenko (2004).or indirectly own equity, as the banks are more likely to provide new debt
when their closely related ﬁrms need capital. The close connections be-
tween banks and large listed ﬁrms have had profound and lasting eﬀects on
corporate ﬁnancing and ownership in Sweden over the last 100 years.
If capital for investments can be supplied primarily through retained
earnings, by borrowing in banks, or by infusion of private capital, ﬁrms
have no immediate need to go through the strictures of equity oﬀers and
place a larger fraction of shares with new investors that may dilute the
value of their private beneﬁts of control and disperse ownership. The So-
cial Democrats have in particular pursued three policies that tend to re-
inforce entrenchment of incumbent owners: (a) allowing bank ownership
of equity; (b) providing strong support for control structures that rigidly
separate votes from capital, for a long time also combined with rigorous
restrictions on foreign ownership of equity; and (c) persistently giving re-
tained earnings and borrowing a tax advantage over equity. The policies
have de facto disfavored the formation of new, fast-growing ﬁrms over in-
cumbent ﬁrms as well as outside equity ﬁnancing by supporting an en-
hanced pecking order of ﬁnancing in established ﬁrms.
The real irony is thus that corporate ownership in Sweden is very con-
centrated not despite, but because of, persistent Social Democratic policies
since the Great Reversal in 1932. The Social Democrats have in fact been
the guarantor rather than the terminator of private capitalism since the po-
litical and corporate incumbencies have been united by strong common in-
terests. Incumbent owners need the political support to legitimize that their
corporate power rests on extensive use of dual-class shares and pyramiding,
while the Social Democrats only get the necessary resources and indirect
support for their social and economic policies from the private sector if the
largest ﬁrms remain under Swedish control so that capital does not migrate.
Before elaborating on these ideas, I start by presenting a general picture
of how corporate ownership has developed historically. After an analytical
description of how the ideology and policies of the Social Democrats have
aﬀected corporate ownership, I develop my simple political theory of why
ownership did not separate widely in Sweden, which focuses on the inter-
action between corporate ownership and development of the primary eq-
uity markets. Before presenting an integrated answer to the three main
questions of this chapter, I critically evaluate the Swedish model of corpo-
rate ownership. To extract some general implications about how history
and politics interact, I speculate about the major exogenous and endoge-
nous factors that caused corporate ownership to follow the path it did in
Sweden. I conclude by putting my analysis in a wider historical context.
9.1 A Stylized History of Corporate Ownership in Sweden
Starting with economic reforms in the 1860s (e.g., freedom to establish
new ﬁrms for men and women and liberalization of foreign trade), Sweden
522 Peter Högfeldtfollowed a trajectory of fast industrialization with the highest recorded
rate of productivity growth between 1870 and 1913; the productivity level
was the second-lowest in Europe in 1970 (Maddison 1982). The export-
oriented raw material sector expanded very fast as it supplied the booming
Western Europe with timber and iron ore. A ﬁrst wave of (domestic) inno-
vations provided the foundation for new (genius) ﬁrms specialized in en-
gineering and manufacturing that became the basis of large export of in-
vestment goods: Atlas Copco (1873), L. M. Ericsson (1876), Alfa-Laval
(1883), ASEA (1883), AGA (1904), and SKF (1907). Already before 1914
the newly founded ﬁrms represented half of the production value in Swe-
dish engineering. The very rapid industrialization until 1914 took place
behind a tariﬀ barrier that averaged about 15 percent. In a second wave of
innovations, primarily international ones adapted to domestic conditions,
new ﬁrms with domestic consumer goods orientation were founded:
Electrolux, Scania-Vabis, Volvo, and SAAB.
The long expansion from 1870, in particular from the 1890s, to 1914 re-
sulted in radical transformation of all facets of society. Sweden is a good
early example of successful export-led growth. The public sector, both at
the central level and in municipalities, raised very signiﬁcant amounts of
capital in international bond issues (primarily from France and Germany)
to ﬁnance the large infrastructural investments in, for example, railroads,
harbors, cities, and housing. Because of very favorable circumstances, the
loans were repaid during World War I. As part of the structural reforms, a
banking system on the Scottish model with deposit banks that issued notes
was built. The new ﬁrms used almost exclusively retained earnings (about
40 percent of proﬁts were reinvested), trade credits, short-term credit
notes, and later short-term bank loans combined with bond ﬁnancing of
machinery and buildings (see Gårdlund 1947). Firms were controlled by a
very small circle of shareholders around the founder and his or her family
(see Jörberg 1988).
Commercial banks (equity backed) developed fast from the 1870s, when
the regulation of interest rates was abandoned. But bank loans did not be-
come an important source of industrial ﬁnancing until around 1900. The
banking industry was well organized and had political support since an
eﬃcient banking system was regarded as crucial for the development of a
relatively poor country. Because of the large export-led industrial expan-
sion after 1900, a relatively large external equity ﬁnancing became neces-
sary. More organized and regular trading started at the Stockholm Stock
Exchange in 1901 as equity replaced the traditional bond ﬁnancing, and
borrowing from banks increased rapidly in response to the increasing de-
mand for capital. The development of the ﬁnancial system in Sweden
seems to be demand driven as new institutions and regulation adjusted to
the changing conditions.
However, despite signiﬁcant increase in demand for investment capital
from the rapidly growing export-oriented industries (manufacturing and
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more important, the capital ﬂows were mainly directed through the bank-
ing system. After heavy lobbying from the banking industry, the Banking
Act of 1911 allowed banks to directly own shares and operate as invest-
ment banks; the leading bankers controlled the public commission that
wrote the law (see Fritz 1990). The German banking system was now the
role model since signiﬁcant infusion of new capital via the (universal)
banking system was argued to be the key to the German economic success.
The banks fueled the speculative stock market boom of the 1910s and
1920s both by helping clients to lever up their portfolios and by buying
most of the relatively frequent equity issues via highly leveraged, stock-
ﬁnanced so-called Issuing Companies (Emissionsbolag) that were very
closely aﬃliated with the banks (see Östlind 1945). The established rela-
tion-based banking system thereby extended its inﬂuence and control also
to the new equity market that developed too late to become a large inde-
pendent supplier of risk capital before the ﬁnancial markets de facto closed
down in the 1930s.
After the crises in the early 1920s the banks owned a signiﬁcant number
of shares in the major listed ﬁrms and became the controlling owner; see
table 9.1. However, since the innovators that founded the ﬁrst generation of
ﬁrms were not equally successful as businessmen, they often lost control,
particularly after ﬁnancial crises, or the control of their family was diluted.
Given the rather advanced technical character of the ﬁrms, an outside pro-
fessional manager with background in engineering and management was
often hired to run the ﬁrm. That the banks became controlling owners re-
inforced this tendency, as they lacked the competence to run the ﬁrms them-
selves. The previously privately controlled ﬁrms that already dispersed their
ownership when issuing new equity to ﬁnance their investments in the 1910s
and 1920s in eﬀect came to be run by the management under supervision of
the controlling bank. It is thus no surprise that the overwhelming majority
of the twenty-ﬁve largest ﬁrms in 1925 are de facto run by the chief execu-
tive oﬃcer (CEO). In fact, an interesting feature of corporate ownership in
Sweden until after World War II is the very strong position of the CEO, who
most often did not own any shares but often had a signiﬁcant support from
minority shareholders. There are examples where the CEO won battles with
the largest owners by accumulating the votes of the minority shareholders.
The ﬁrms were frequently identiﬁed more with their CEO than with their
controlling owners; there are several cases where the CEO built a dynasty by
letting his son or son-in-law succeed him.4
After the ﬁnancial crises in the 1930s when banks owned very large port-
folios of listed stocks and de facto controlled the largest listed ﬁrms, the
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4. For example, three generations of Laurin were CEOs of PLM without owning any shares
and despite the fact that one father warned the owners to let his son succeed him.Swedish 1934 (light) version of Glass-Steagall prohibited them from di-
rectly owning equity, but a few years later they were allowed to transfer
their assets to holding companies if the shares were distributed to the
bank’s shareholders. The controlling owners of the banks thus maintained
control and, in eﬀect, reinforced it, since the holding companies were for-
mally separated from the banks but were organized as (listed) closed-end
investment funds (CEIFs), which became the pivotal entity around which
the typical three-level Swedish ownership pyramid is built: a controlling
family or bank foundation at the apex and the listed portfolio ﬁrms at the
bottom, which are controlled via the CEIF at the intermediate level. Fig-
ure 9.1 illustrates the transparent three-level structure of the Wallenberg
ownership pyramid in 1996 with Investor in the middle as the pivotal
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Table 9.1 Ownership and controlling owners in the twenty-ﬁve largest industrial ﬁrms in
Sweden in 1925
No. of  Type of 
Firm Employees Controlling owner control
ASEA 7,000 M
Stora Kopparberg 7,000 Wallenberg E (M)
Svenska Tändsticks AB 5,000 Ivar Kreuger F
Grängesberg/LKAB 5,200 M




L. M. Ericsson 3,500 K. E. Wincrantz Ivar Kreuger FE
Husqvarna 3,300 M
Tobaksmonopolet 3,200 Government M
Sockerbolaget 3,000 M
Ytterstforss-Munksund 3,000 Svenska Handelsbanken M
Holmens Bruk 3,000 Wahren M
Gimo-Österby 3,000 Svenska Handelsbanken M
Sandviken 3,000 Göransson/Magnusson F
Skånska Cement 2,600 Wehtje FM
Götaverken 2,500 Broström ME
Separator 2,300 Cross-holdings M
NOHAB 2,300 Göteborgs Handelsbank M
Billerud 2,200 M
Bergvik & Ala 2,200 Svenska Handelsbanken M
A. K. Fernström 2,100 Fernström F
Iggesund 2,000 Trygger/Von Sydow ME
Skönvik 2,000 Bunsow Svenska Handelsbanken M
Malmö Yllefabrik 1,900 Schmitz Skandinavbanken F
Source: Glete (1994).
Notes: Type of controlling owners: F (family control and CEO member of the founding family); E (en-
trepreneurial control; controlling owner appoints the CEO and is active in the board); and M (manage-
ment independent of owners).Fig. 9.1 The Wallenberg sphere in January 1996
Source: Reproduced from Sundin and Sundqvist (1996).
Note: Vote ownership is reported with equity ownership in parentheses.control vehicle of the largest listed ﬁrms in Sweden, and the tax-exempt
family foundations at the top.
Investor was founded by the Wallenberg-controlled Stockholms En-
skilda Bank (today SEB) while Industrivärden, the other leading holding
company (CEIF), was founded by the management-controlled Svenska
Handelsbanken (SHB). Starting already in the 1920s, the banks exercised
more inﬂuence as shareholders and sometimes also as controlling owners
at the same time as being the major provider of loans. Since the equity
markets de facto closed down in the 1930s, the banking law made the ﬁ-
nancial capital the dominant supplier of capital, and the bankers became
business leaders even if the CEOs had a strong position without owning
shares. The banks restructured the ﬁnancially distressed Swedish industri-
als using intermediated capital and active management of their portfolio
(see Larsson 2002). A combination of political conditions and ﬁnancial
crises reversed the road to dispersed ownership.
It is particularly interesting to observe that the two pivotal reforms of bank
ownership in 1911 and 1934 both had the strong support of the Social De-
mocrats; without their votes, together with those of the Liberals in 1911, there
would not have been any reform.5They wrote the new law in 1934 after gain-
ing power in 1932. When the Social Democrats formed their ﬁrst minority
government in 1920, Hjalmar Branting appointed Johannes Hellner, head of
the legal department at Stockholms Enskilda Bank, to ﬁnance minister.
Because of a sequence of pivotal political decisions, supported by both
the Social Democrats and the political voice of leading capitalists, listed
ﬁrms in Sweden have primarily relied on retained earnings—the traditional
but also signiﬁcantly tax-subsidized way of ﬁnancing—and bank loans but
have only to a very limited extent issued new shares. The largest ﬁrms were
linked to their main bank as supplier of credits while the ﬁrms deposited
money and did their banking with their hausbank. Analyzing credit con-
tracts between listed ﬁrms and large banks between 1916 and 1947, Sjögren
(1995) ﬁnds that forty-six of ﬁfty nonﬁnancial listed ﬁrms entered contracts
that lasted for at least ﬁve years. Of the listed ﬁrms, 40 percent had contracts
that lasted for the whole period. More than 30 percent of the ﬁrms had
credit, ownership, deposit, and bond issuance contracts with only one
bank. But the other side of ﬁnancial interaction was a tight network of piv-
otal persons around the bank; the controlling owners or CEOs of the listed
ﬁrms were often represented on the bank’s board while representatives of
the bank had seats in the ﬁrms’ boards. Figure 9.2 illustrates the alliances
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5. In 1905 Marcus Wallenberg senior argued that Sweden had great untapped resources,
able engineers, and good workers but lacked entrepreneurs. His remedy was to start a busi-
ness school and allow banks to buy shares in listed companies. His family helped found Stock-
holm’s School of Economics in 1909. And his elder half-brother K. A. Wallenberg, chief ex-
ecutive of Stockholm’s Enskilda Bank, chairman of the Swedish Bankers’ Association, and
member of Parliament, spearheaded an initiative to allow the largest commercial banks to
own shares and to begin acting as investment banks. Against the will of the Conservative gov-
ernment but with the support of the Social Democrats, his proposal was adopted in 1911.Fig. 9.2 The banks and the largest ﬁrms in 1960
Source: Hermansson (1965, p. 190).
Notes: The full line indicates that managing directors and/or board members of the bank are
also board members of large ﬁrms that do their major borrowing and other ﬁnancial activi-
ties with the bank. The dotted lines show that there is only an indirect relation as old man-
agers or nonboard members aﬃliated with the bank are also board members of client ﬁrms.and very close relations between leading representatives of the major banks,
in particular the three largest ones—Enskilda Banken (Wallenberg), Skan-
dinavbanken, and Handelsbanken—and industrial ﬁrms in 1960 (see Her-
mansson [1965], former leader of the Communist Party in Sweden). The
lines (dotted lines) indicate a direct (indirect) link between the banks and
the main borrowers as the banks’ managing directors or board members are
members of the board of their main industrial clients.
Table 9.2shows the ownership and control of the largest listed ﬁrms right
after the war in 1945. The size of the ﬁrms has become signiﬁcantly larger,
and owners, in particular the Wallenberg group, have advanced their posi-
tion even if management control under bank supervision is the norm while
control by founding ﬁrms has diminished further. Using a Swedish Census
on equity ownership from 1945, Lindgren (1953) reports that 6 to 7 percent
of shareholders controlled 65 to 70 percent of the market value. Analyzing
records from the shareholders’ general meetings, he ﬁnds that a single in-
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Table 9.2 Ownership and controlling owners in the twenty-ﬁve largest industrial
ﬁrms in Sweden in 1945
No. of  Type of 
Firm Employees Controlling owner control
ASEA 23,200 Wallenberg ME
Uddeholm 11,000 M
Bofors 9,200 Axel Wenner-Gren M
SKF 8,500 Mark/Carlander Wallenberg (E)
L. M. Ericsson 7,500 ITT, SHB-Group Wallenberg E
Stora Kopparberg 7,500 Wallenberg E
SCA 7,000 SHB-Gruppen M
Esselte 6,700 M
Fagersta 6,400 SHB-Gruppen M
Svenska Tändsticks AB 6,200 Wallenberg E
Grängesberg/LKAB 6,200 M
Götaverken 6,000 AB Gillius (Management) M
Sandviken 5,900 Göransson/Magnusson F
Husqvarna 5,800 M
Hellefors Bruk 5,300 Custos M
Skånska Cementgjuteriet 4,500 Wehtje E
Skånska Cement/IFÖ 4,500 Wehtje F
Sockerbolaget 4,000 M
Volvo 3,700 M
Svenska Metallverken 3,500 M
Billerud 3,500 M
Boliden 3,500 Skandinaviska Banken M
Separator 3,300 Wallenberg ME
Höganäs-Billesholm 3,100 M
Kockums Mek Verkstad 3,000 Kockum E
Source: Glete (1994).
Notes: See table 9.1 notes.dividual represented the majority of votes in 60 percent of the large ﬁrms
(more than 500 employees) while three or fewer owners constituted the ma-
jority in over 90 percent of these ﬁrms. In regularly quoted ﬁrms, a single
individual represented the majority in 53 percent of the cases, while in 85
percent of the ﬁrms the two largest owners represented more than 50 per-
cent of the votes.
Figure 9.3 shows the so-called ﬁfteen families and their controlling in-
terests and ﬁnancial networks in 1960, which Hermansson (1965) identi-
ﬁed as the ultimate controlling owners of the listed ﬁrms in Sweden. Of the
ﬁfty largest industrial ﬁrms, forty-one are controlled by these families (nine
are controlled by the state or by cooperatives or municipalities). The gov-
ernment commission on ownership and inﬂuence in private industry
(Statens Oﬀentliga Utredningar [SOU] 1968a) analyzed the situation in
1963 and identiﬁed the same ﬁfteen families as well as two bank-related
groups as the controlling owners. It is interesting to observe that the nine
families that were closely tied to Handelsbanken and Skadinavbanken do
not exert any power today or are signiﬁcantly marginalized; an exception
might be the Klingspors, who, through their association with the Stenbeck
Group, still exert power. Of the families with very close personal ties to
Enskilda Banken and Investor, the main family, the Wallenbergs, is still in
control, even if their control has become diluted in recent years due to large
international mergers (ABB, AstraZeneca, and Stora Enso) and concen-
tration of their portfolio investments. The Bonnier and Johnsson families
have been rejuvenated in the ﬁfth generation and are still inﬂuential even if
their relative position has declined. The Wehtje and Throne-Holst families,
and to a lesser extent the Söderberg family, have been marginalized since
1967 or exert no power today.
But already in 1967 the very rapid growth and international expansion
of the leading ﬁrms in the 1950s and 1960s had undercut the family control
of the largest listed ﬁrms even if the families more frequently changed to a
dual-class structure in order to maintain control when raising new capital.
Only 18 percent of the largest listed ﬁrms used such a control structure in
1950, but almost one-third used it in 1968. However, as table 9.3 illustrates,
the ﬁnancial capital became dominant and the Wallenberg group in par-
ticular had the ﬁnancial muscle when the equity markets were dormant.
The increasing capital demands to establish a large ownership position is
also evident from table 9.4, which shows the frequency of ownership posi-
tions sorted both by size of ownership (by capital—not votes) and by size
of the 100 largest ﬁrms in terms of employment in 1950, 1963, 1978, and
1985. The frequency of small but identiﬁable holdings has decreased very
signiﬁcantly over the years, while the number of larger positions has in-
creased, particularly in the larger ﬁrms, which indicates that owners with
more capital resources have become more dominant, even without consid-
ering their extra voting power due to the frequent use of dual-class shares.
530 Peter HögfeldtFig. 9.3 The ﬁfteen ﬁnancial families and their controlling interests in 1960
Source: Hermansson (1965, p. 289).
Note:This ﬁgure shows the network between the ﬁnancial families and the ﬁrms they control,
as well as their relations with the three major banks (Enskilda Banken, Skandinavbanken,
and Handelsbanken) and with holding companies (closed-end investment funds like Investor,
Custos, and Industrivärden) associated with the banks and with insurance companies (e.g.,
Skandia, Thule, and SPP).Table 9.5 shows that in 1990 the largest ﬁrms have become signiﬁcantly
larger due mergers and acquisitions while the Wallenbergs remained in
control. However, the number of management-controlled ﬁrms is still high,
in particular since three of the most important—Sandvik, Skanska, and
Volvo—developed an elaborate system of cross-shareholdings to fend oﬀ
potential hostile takeovers as more developed liquid markets facilitated
such endeavors. New ﬁnancial operators became active during the 1980s—
Anders Wall, Erik Penser, and Sven-Olof Johansson, to name a few—but
their importance vanished during the 1990s. More recent additions are
Carl Bennet, Gustaf Douglas, Sven Hagströmer, Mats Qviberg, Fredrik
Lundberg, Melker Schörling, and Jan Stenbeck who have built and rebuilt
existing ﬁrms into controlling groups using entrepreneurial ﬁnancial skills.
In recent years the Wallenberg power sphere has let go of control in Alfa-
Laval, Esab, KemaNobel, SAAB Automobile, Swedish Match, and par-
tially of Scania and most parts of the Incentive conglomerate and of Dili-
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Table 9.3 Ownership and controlling owners in the twenty-ﬁve largest industrial
ﬁrms in Sweden in 1967
No. of  Type of 
Firm Employees Controlling owner control
SKF 64,759 Wallenberg, Asken M (E)
L. M. Ericsson 46,400 Wallenberg SHB-Gruppen E
ASEA 32,401 Wallenberg E
Svenska Tändsticks AB 31,800 Wallenberg E
Volvo 24,268 M
Electrolux 20,964 Wallenberg E
Alfa-Laval 17,837 Wallenberg E
Skånska Cementgjuteriet 17,518 Skånska Cement M
Grängesberg 16,010 M
Uddeholm 15,812 Custos M
Sandviken 14,850 Klingspor/Stenbeck E
SCA 14,121 SHB-Gruppen M
SAAB 13,699 Wallenberg E
BPA 13,000 TUC M
Facit 12,832 Ericsson M
Bofors 12,300 M
AGA 12,244 SHB-Gruppen M
Stora Kopparberg 11,371 Wallenberg E
Atlas Copco 11,196 Wallenberg E
Skånska Cement 9,638 M
Scania Vabis 9,280 Wallenberg E
Götaverken 8,274 AB Gillius (Management) M
Mo & Domsjö 8,017 Kempe/Carlgren F
Svenska Metallverken 7,775 SHB-Gruppen F
Esselte 7,668 M
Source: Glete (1994).
Notes: See table 9.1 notes.gentia, while establishing control of Gambro, WM-Data, and a portfolio
of smaller ﬁrms. The group has also been instrumental in abolishing shares
with a 1:1000 voting diﬀerential in Electrolux and SKF but not in Ericsson
until 2004, when the A-shares were ﬁnally converted to a new diﬀerential
of 1:10 as the other controlling owner, Industrivärden, (ﬁnally) accepted
the negotiated compensation for old A-shares. Instead of a joint voting
strength of over 80 percent in Ericsson, they now only control around 40
percent of the votes.
The long-run survival of controlling families in Sweden looks as follows.
Four (Wallenberg, Bonnier, Johnson, and Söderberg) of the fourteen fami-
lies that established control before 1920 are still exerting control, while six
(Rausing, Kamprad, Olsson, Wallenius, Persson, and Stenbeck) of the
twenty-three families that founded ﬁrms between 1920 and 1965 are still sig-
niﬁcant and active owners today. Other vanished slowly and maintained po-
sitions until the 1980s: Kempe/Carlgren, Salén, Edstrand, Roos, Malmros,
von Kantzow, Throne-Holst, Philipson, and Wendt. These families were
well connected, but most likely the entrepreneurial spirit ran out—and so
did their ﬁnancial resources. Newer additions have shown much worse sur-
vival rates. The addition in recent years of new family-controlled ﬁrms that
have grown large very fast has been very limited indeed; the very old ﬁrms
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Table 9.4 Frequency of ownership positions sorted both by size of ownership
(capital) and by size of the 100 largest ﬁrms in terms of employment in
1950, 1963, 1978, and 1985 (%)
 2.0 2.0–5.0 5.0–10.0 10.0–25.0 25.0–50.0 50.0–100
1950
Firms 1–25 347 34 13 5 5 2
Firms 26–50 149 48 14 23 6 4
Firms 51–75 128 25 14 19 8 9
Firms 76–100 70 33 15 7 8 12
1963
Firms 1–25 388 63 21 5 7 3
Firms 26–50 336 67 19 9 6 1
Firms 51–75 169 77 24 16 6 7
Firms 76–100 140 66 23 18 4 11
1978
Firms 1–25 10 89 18 16 5 2
Firms 26–50 14 81 35 17 4 3
Firms 51–75 1 43 31 15 10 7
Firms 76–100 2 53 11 9 12 11
1985
Firms 1–25 28 89 39 21 9 3
Firms 26–50 14 81 44 17 10 4
Firms 51–75 14 51 32 21 14 9
Firms 76–100 4 57 17 17 17 8
Source: Studieförbundet Näringsliv och Samhälle (SNS) Ownership Project (1988).534 Peter Högfeldt
Table 9.5 Ownership and controlling owners in the twenty-ﬁve largest industrial
ﬁrms in Sweden in 1990
No. of  Type of 
Firm Employees Controlling owner control
ASEA Brown Boveri 215,154 Wallenberg Brown Boveri E (M)
Electrolux 150,892 Wallenberg E
Volvo 72,213 Volvo-Skanska Cross-Shareholding M
Stora 69,700 Wallenberg E
Ericsson 66,138 Wallenberg SHB-Gruppen ME
SKF 49,305 Wallenberg Skanska ME
Procordia 45,193 Government/Volvo ME
Skanska 31,746 Volvo-Skanska Cross Shareholding M
SCA 30,139 SHB-Gruppen M
Saab Scania 29,388 Wallenberg E
Nobel Industrier 26,654 Penser E
Sandvik 26,373 Skanska M
NCC 23,178 Johnsson’s Foundations E
Trelleborg 21,939 Dunker’s Foundation M
Atlas Copco 21,507 Wallenberg E
Alfa-Laval 20,809 Wallenberg E
Esselte 19,545 Lindholm E
ASEA 18,066 Wallenberg E
BPA 17,948 TUC M
AGA 14,559 SHB-Gruppen M
Cardo 14,080 Volvo M
MoDo 12,961 Kempe/Carlgren (SCA) E
Svenskt Stål AB 12,014 Government ME
SIAB 9,814 Lundberg E
FFV 9,709 Government ME
Source: Glete (1994).
Notes: See table 9.1 notes.
still dominate, even if the number of family-controlled ﬁrms among initial
public oﬀerings (IPOs) had been high (see Holmén and Högfeldt 2004a).
Signiﬁcant legal restrictions on foreign ownership have been an impor-
tant ingredient of the Swedish ownership model. Starting with the ban on
foreigners’ owning real estate and mines in the nineteenth century, foreign
ownership was in 1916 limited to 20 percent of voting rights in Swedish
ﬁrms owning natural resources. In the 1930s foreign ownership in listed
ﬁrms was limited to so-called unrestricted shares (representing at most 20
percent of the voting rights), while restricted shares could only be owned
by Swedish individuals and institutions.6 There has been a dramatic in-
6. To circumvent the 20 percent voting restriction on foreign ownership in order to raise
large amounts of equity capital in the U.S. capital markets in the late 1920s, ﬁrms controlled
by Ivar Kreuger, like Ericsson and SKF, introduced B-shares with a 1/1000 voting right. In
1983 the restriction on foreign ownership of natural resources was adjusted to the dual sys-
tem for foreign ownership of shares in listed ﬁrms in the Corporate Purchase Act (Företags-
förvärvslagen).crease in foreign ownership of listed shares since 1993, when the restric-
tions on foreign ownership were abolished. Anticipating that direct foreign
ownership of equity will be allowed as part of the process to join the Euro-
pean Union (EU), many family-controlled ﬁrms started to use dual-class
shares in the 1980s; an overwhelming majority of them used them in the
early 1990s.
Looking further back at trends, direct ownership of listed shares by
Swedish households decreased from 75 percent in 1950 to about 25 percent
in 1990, while ownership by Swedish institutions increased from about 20
percent in 1950 to 70 percent in 1990; foreign ownership was well below 10
percent during this period but is currently around 35 percent. These types
of portfolio investments are primarily in B-shares. The original owners
have therefore most frequently managed to remain in control by using
dual-class shares more eﬃciently. But the institutional capital has deﬁ-
nitely become much more important in Sweden and has recently, some-
what reluctantly, started to exert responsibility and power as large provid-
ers of capital but not necessarily as controlling owners.
Table 9.6 shows that almost seventy years after the formal legal separa-
tion from the banks, the two closed-end funds—Investor and Industrivär-
den—are still the major controlling owners of the largest listed ﬁrms. Even
if the pyramids are shallow, the combined eﬀect with dual-class shares cre-
ates a substantial control multiplier: total equity value of ﬁrms controlled
by CEIFs divided by value of capital invested by controlling owners. For
example, panel A shows that in year 2000 the controlling owners’ invest-
ments in the CEIFs were worth 80 billion Svenska Kronor (SEK), which
amounts to 2.6 percent of the market capitalization of the Stockholm
Stock Exchange. The total market value of listed ﬁrms de facto controlled
by the CEIFs (largest fraction of votes) was 1,786 billion SEK, which is 57
percent of the market capitalization of 3,135 billion SEK (excluding the
market value of CEIFs).7 The control multiplier was thus 22 (57/2.6) in
2000 and has grown over time.
Panel B shows the dominance of the two most powerful CEIFs—In-
vestor and Industrivärden—where the pivotal owners controlled almost 50
percent of the market capitalization by investing only 2 percent of the mar-
ket capitalization. The control multiplier for the two combined was thus 23.8
The ﬁrms controlled by CEIFs do not only dominate the stock market
capitalization. They are also extremely important for general economic
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7. At the end of 2000, four (twelve) of the ten (twenty) largest ﬁrms (market value equity)
in Sweden were controlled by CEIFs.
8. The dramatic increase in the CEIF control multiplier in 1991 is due to intragroup
takeovers. Industrivärden acquired Bahco (previously named Promotion), the other CEIF
controlled by the SHB group, while Investor acquired another Wallenberg-controlled CEIF,
Providentia. The value under control remained roughly the same, but the value of the con-
trolling owners’ listed investments decreased. The same year Investor also acquired Saab,
where the Wallenbergs had a large direct ownership. In 1994 Investor also acquired Export-

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.activity in Sweden. In 2000 CEIF-controlled ﬁrms generated 38 percent of
the Swedish gross domestic product (GDP).9And in 1999 their investments
constituted 28 percent of the gross capital formation in the business sector.
By controlling a large share of the corporate capital in Sweden, the pyra-
mids’ investment decisions thus have signiﬁcant impact on the overall al-
location of economic resources. Even if the separation of ownership and
control in pyramid structures is a well-established international phenome-
non, the very large control multiplier in CEIFs may thus have wider eco-
nomic implications in Sweden.10
Via Investor the Wallenbergs also exert signiﬁcant political inﬂuence
both externally and within the business community, for example, by being
the controlling owners (together with the government) of the Stockholm
Stock Exchange (SSE) and by in eﬀect setting their own standards for list-
ing requirements and for ethical codes—the Swedish version of self-
regulation. After the equity markets were reactivated in the 1980s and ﬁrms
needed more capital as the size of ﬁrms grew rapidly, the two funds’ control
has in fact increased because of very extensive use of dual-class shares.
Overall entrenchment of corporate ownership has increased since other
listed ﬁrms as well as newly listed IPO ﬁrms have also used dual-class shares
in an unprecedented way to maintain control; around 60 percent of the
listed ﬁrms use dual-class shares. Despite the very signiﬁcant increase of in-
stitutional capital and foreign capital, corporate ownership is as entrenched
as ever in Sweden since the largest ﬁrms are still controlled by an old ﬁnan-
cial nobility of families in the third to ﬁfth generation and by banks, but to
a much lesser extent by institutions that provide the majority of the capital.
The conﬂict between private control and increasing capital demands is
thus handled in Sweden by strategic pyramiding and more frequent use of
dual-class shares that increases the separation between control and owner-
ship over time. The pivotal corporate control of the largest listed ﬁrms thus
remains in Swedish hands while the capital becomes more institutionalized
and international. The rest of the paper is an attempt to explain why this hap-
pened and what the long-term consequences are. It is a highly political story!
9.2 Social Democracy and Capitalism
The historical agenda of the Social Democrats had three stages: ﬁrst, the
ﬁght for political democracy (suﬀrage), then use of parliamentary power to
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9. GDP and capital formation numbers are collected from Statistiska Centralbyrån (SCB,
Statistics Sweden).
10. The Social Democrats have demonstrated an active interest in the development of own-
ership concentration in the private industry, in particular in the banking sector, as evident
from a string of governmental reports from the 1960s to the end of the 1980s (SOU 1968a,b,
1988; Statens Industriverk [SIND] 1980:5), when domestic capital markets as well as interna-
tional capital ﬂows were heavily regulated.implement social democracy (an egalitarian welfare state), and ﬁnally eco-
nomic democracy, wherein economic decisions within ﬁrms are not based
on strict private rationality but reﬂect the wider social interest of the ﬁrm’s
stakeholders and society at large. The electoral victory in 1932 initiated
implementation of the social democracy. The existing industrial structure
with relatively large-scale production in a few export-oriented ﬁrms, often
with a well-deﬁned controlling owner or a strong manager, suited their vi-
sion of the road to economic democracy quite well. They did not envision
direct nationalization of industries but a stakeholder form of socialism that
was more eﬃcient than pure capitalism because it contained elements of
rational planning that would eliminate the waste that irrational, short-
sighted markets create, like unemployment and volatile investment cycles.
The necessary economic changes would also be faster and more eﬃciency-
enhancing if they took place in ways that were more socially acceptable for
workers. Egalitarianism and economic eﬃciency were thus not necessarily
contradictory concepts.
The ideological motivation was the almost existential conﬂict built into
capitalism between private ownership of capital (ﬁrms) and the ever-
growing social character of production; workers are not only a production
factor but also members of society with social needs, and private economic
decisions within ﬁrms will have a wider and deeper impact on society at
large. The immediate needs of the workers within the ﬁrm would be pro-
tected by their union’s negotiating with the employer about compensation
and working conditions without governmental intervention (except for ba-
sic regulation); that is, the adversarial relations between labor and capital
would be respected without board representation of labor. Their more gen-
eral social interests outside the ﬁrm (e.g., employment, pension, educa-
tion, and housing) would be protected via Social Democratic political ini-
tiatives to build a tax-ﬁnanced public sector that redistributed resources
between individuals and families and provided social services and insur-
ance. The overriding objective was, however, to create a full employment
economy by promoting growth-enhancing policies that stimulated labor
mobility as well as investments and restructuring within the industrial sec-
tor. Higher growth would not only generate higher wages but also increase
welfare by ﬁnancing the public sector.
The Social Democrats’ vision of economic growth was large-scale pro-
duction with ever-growing ﬁrm size, as resources are better used within a
planned hierarchy than in markets; in particular, allocations to large in-
vestments and to large-scale R&D are more eﬃcient (see, e.g., Wigforss
1980, vol. I). To realize the idea of a more eﬃcient, higher stage of capital-
ism the pivotal factor was to induce capitalists to invest more, particularly
in long-term capital-intensive production; a good capitalist is one who ful-
ﬁlls his or her basic economic function of investing. The increasing de-
pendence of very large ﬁrms would also make the social character of pro-
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and wider societal concerns aﬀect the private economic decisions within
the ﬁrm. This was in eﬀect a vision of a corporatist society with capitalis-
tic ﬁrms without capitalists, as their decision power would be cut back to
the decision to invest; capital would remain within the ﬁrm as investments
ﬁnanced by retained earnings were heavily tax subsidized. Firms would be
run in the interests of society at large and not in the narrow, private eco-
nomic interests of essentially nominal owners. Or to use the words of Ernst
Wigforss (1980), the leading ideologue and minister of ﬁnance from 1932
to 1949, “social ﬁrms without owners.” Taming of capitalism thus did not
imply immediate takeover of private ownership as long as the capitalists in-
vested.
The existing corporate structure of relatively few but large, export-
oriented ﬁrms closely aﬃliated with and often controlled by the major
banks actually ﬁtted the corporatist vision very well. Banks are intrinsi-
cally relatively more important than individual ﬁrms, as they are pivotal
nodes in the network that allocates capital across ﬁrms and individuals,
which may make it easier for them to assume wider societal concerns. How-
ever, perhaps more important, being both major lenders and providers of
equity capital to the often highly leveraged ﬁrms, the controlling banks in
eﬀect acted more like bondholders with focus on long-term survival than
as thoroughbred, risk-taking capitalists. They are therefore more inclined
to adopt a long-term perspective with less focus on myopic proﬁts and are
more ready to accept social considerations when ﬁring and hiring people.
In particular, they are more likely to ﬁnance large, capital-intensive invest-
ments that are also socially desirable. Such owners are also more conducive
to respond to tax-based policies that strongly stimulate reinvestment of re-
tained earnings in the large, established ﬁrms.11
The idea of social ﬁrms without owners was part of a greater vision of a
socially planned (democratic) economy that consisted of an integrated set
of policies: for example, tax-based policies to promote and direct invest-
ments, and regulations to channel household savings to politically con-
trolled funds that allocate capital to socially desirable objectives like in-
vestment in housing, infrastructure and education. But this set of policies
also included programs to stimulate growth by promotion of innovations,
labor market mobility, and extensive research in cooperation with the lead-
ing capitalists and their ﬁrms. The pivotal element was to generate a higher
overall growth rate by policies that stimulated savings and allocated in-
vestments more eﬃciently by also incorporating wider societal objectives.
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11. In the 1950s Galbraith’s book from 1956—American Capitalism: The Concept of Coun-
tervailing Power—and later his 1967 book, The New Industrial State, had a strong inﬂuence
on the leading Social Democrats with its blessing of large-scale production. He was invited
by the prime minister for a two-day conference with leading representatives of the Swedish
society.The higher growth might then be used to ﬁnance the social reform agenda.
The programs would be implemented by the Social Democrats but in close
cooperation with the capitalists. How was it done?
9.2.1 The First Step on the Road to Economic Democracy: 
Cooperation in Corporatist Spirit
For two reasons, 1938 is a pivotal year. First, to avoid political interven-
tion and legislation to regulate the tempestuous labor market relations but
also to appease unions that voiced more radical political demands, the
Swedish Confederation of Employers (SAF) initiated talks with LO (the
TUC) that resulted in a general accord—Saltsjöbadsavtalet—that regu-
lated their interactions. It contained rules for negations and conﬂict reso-
lution, procedures for how to ﬁre and lay oﬀ workers, and procedures for
how to limit the detrimental eﬀects on third parties and society at large.
The implicit trade-oﬀin the agreement was that SAF recognized the LO as
a full and equal counterparty representing all workers, while LO accepted
the employers’ right to unilaterally direct and assign the work load between
workers. The accord had a distinct corporatist character and established a
spirit of consensus and cooperation in labor market relations that stressed
common economic goals—saltsjöbadsandan—and lasted for almost forty
years, until 1976, when LO abandoned the accord. It was particularly
strong after the mid-1950s, when SAF initiated centralized wage negotia-
tions between the parties (perhaps due to an increased labor shortage).
The second pivotal event in 1938 was the reform of corporate taxes to
grant free depreciation allowances for machines and equipment. This sys-
tem beneﬁted large, proﬁtable, and capital-intensive ﬁrms, as historical
proﬁts (retained earnings) determine future investments. Since the rules
were also very generous by international standards, the previous hostility
toward Social Democratic policies from leading CEOs of ASEA, Electro-
lux, L. M. Ericsson, Separator (Alfa-Laval), and SKF (called the Big Five
[TBF]) subsided, even if this political pressure group existed until 1953.
Starting in 1958, the corporate tax system allowed accelerated deprecia-
tion for machines and equipment (maximum 40 percent of proﬁts before
taxes in an investment fund) while at the same time depositing 46 percent
of the depreciation allowance in an account in the Central Bank that did
not pay any interest and could only be used if approved by the bank as part
of general business-cycle policies.
These two major changes in 1938 made cooperation between labor and
capital the norm for interaction in the corporatist society but biased the
ﬁrms’ investment criterion, as retained earnings became the major tax-
subsidized source of ﬁnancing. Almost concurrently, the major banks were
allowed to transfer the signiﬁcant corporate assets they held after the crises
in the early 1930s to holding companies organized as closed-end invest-
ment funds. By making their temporary ownership in the aftermath of the
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largest listed ﬁrms, even if formally only at arm’s length. These three
changes shaped what might be called the Swedish model and had long-run
implications for the future political and economic developments.
9.2.2 The Second Step: The Corporatist Innovation Model
The Social Democratic vision of the social ﬁrm was a large, capital-
intensive ﬁrm that invests heavily, particularly in R&D, in order to be more
productive and to grow larger. The basic idea is that innovations are best
developed in and commercially implemented by very large export-oriented
ﬁrms. Small ﬁrms may innovate but are of limited importance and can be
appropriated by the larger ones that undertake R&D in a more rational
systematic way and can carry the large ﬁxed costs because of their size. The
importance of entrepreneurs who develop innovations commercially by
founding new, viable, and rapidly growing ﬁrms was heavily discounted by
the leading Social Democrats, as they argued that capitalism had reached
a higher and more advanced stage of large-scale production and innova-
tion. Entrepreneurship was thus implicitly assumed to be exogenously
given despite the fact that the leading Swedish ﬁrms were founded not so
long ago by innovators who turned entrepreneurs.
In fact, the Swedish model has two innovation systems (see Erixon
1997). In the fundamental systemthe large, mature ﬁrms in engineering and
manufacturing produce or acquire new ideas through their international
contacts and transmit them to their domestic plants and other ﬁrms. Ex-
posure to foreign competition and demanding customers abroad forces the
export-oriented ﬁrms to assimilate and develop new ideas into commercial
products. These innovations are not of breakthrough character that estab-
lishes new ﬁrms; rather, they shape or reshape existing ﬁrms to maintain
their competitive edge. This innovation system is thus an integrated part of
the large export-oriented ﬁrms, as it both feeds on the international net-
work and is a prerequisite to remain internationally competitive.
The regulated system of innovations is more domestically oriented and is
based on the cooperative interaction between public authorities (not pri-
marily universities) and large domestic ﬁrms mainly producing investment
goods and advanced products. The authorities may stimulate innovations
through public procurements (military orders), technical cooperation with
authorities (between Ericsson [telecommunication systems] and Televerket
[monopoly operator]), through regulation and setting of standards (hous-
ing, energy transmission and consumption, safety, and environment), and
through tax policies like the free allowance of R&D expenditures (more
than 90 percent of the R&D spending in the Swedish manufacturing in-
dustry during the postwar period was ﬁnanced within the ﬁrm).
The regulated innovation system has probably been the more important
since it amounts to a rather direct form of economic support of the largest
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“planned” economy with coordinated public policies. For example, be-
hind tariﬀs and import restrictions, and with support of tax subsidies for
ﬁrms to buy trucks and cars, and heavy public investments in the national
traﬃc system, the transportation industry developed very fast during the
early postwar period. Using regional subsidies, SAAB and in particular
Volvo integrated backward and developed an elaborate network of decen-
tralized suppliers; the transportation industry became a very large em-
ployer and a signiﬁcant export industry. The saying “what is good for
Volvo is good for Sweden” was commonly accepted. But without the pro-
tection and support of specially designed public policies Sweden would
not be the domicile of two (Scania and Volvo) of the three largest manu-
facturers of heavy trucks in the world. Without the public support from
universities (elaborate education of engineers and advanced research), re-
gional subsidies, and large advance public orders Ericsson would not have
become the largest supplier of telecommunication systems in the world.
Similar programs were developed for huge investments in energy produc-
tion and systems, for highways and for housing: the Million Program be-
tween 1965 and 1974.
This cooperation in large-scale projects between public authorities and
the largest ﬁrms had a signiﬁcant corporatist and somewhat nationalistic
ﬂavor as the unions actively participated and the coordinated eﬀorts were
heralded as part of the national project to build the country in a spirit of
strong consensus under Social Democratic leadership. It is striking how
strong the coordination and integration of the policies (industrial, re-
gional, tax, and labor market policies) were toward a common goal of de-
veloping a more rational, social economy that satisﬁed the people’s needs
through signiﬁcant interventionism, in particular by directing and coordi-
nating large-scale investments with signiﬁcant externalities.
The very large public investment projects were ﬁnanced by taxes but also
by the channeling of savings to public pension funds (the Allmän Tjänste-
pension [ATP] system with three original Allmänna Pensionsfonderna
[AP] funds; later supplemented by a fourth fund that also invested in eq-
uity) that invested in public bonds. Since the equity markets in eﬀect were
closed down until the early 1980s and the Central Bank and the Ministry
of Finance controlled the capital ﬂows in the ﬁnancial system, banks and
insurance companies were forced to invest very heavily in public bonds, in
particular to ﬁnance the very large housing program. To channel house-
hold savings to collective funds and direct their investments was a very im-
portant part of the policies to implement a social democracy and use po-
litical power to direct investments. These policies in eﬀect made the large
listed ﬁrms even more dependent on retained earnings to ﬁnance invest-
ments; the volume of bank loans was regulated and capped while the eq-
uity markets were not operational.
The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership in Sweden 5439.2.3 The Third Step: The Labor Market Model
An important part of the growth policies was the so-called active la-
bor market policies initiated by LO in 1951: the Rehn-Meidner model
(see Hedborg and Meidner 1984 and Korpi 1978). To sustain a full-
employment economy that grows without inﬂation, that idea was to sup-
port reallocation of resources and employment away from industries that
are not internationally competitive to more productive industries with sus-
tainable growth opportunities. Through solidaristic wage policies that
compress the wage diﬀerential at a high average level that maintains the in-
ternational competitiveness of the export-oriented sector, the overall pro-
ductivity would increase by speeding up the closing down of ﬁrms in less
productive industries while in eﬀect inducing ﬁrms in more competitive in-
dustries to become more eﬃcient by investing in more capital-intensive
technologies. The model tends to generate excess proﬁts in the most com-
petitive ﬁrms, as they pay relatively low wages. Combined with labor mar-
ket policies that retrain workers and stimulate their geographic and occu-
pational mobility by compensating them for loss of income and extra costs
when relocating, the model enhances the dynamic eﬃciency in the econ-
omy without causing too high inﬂationary pressure. The public sector
would thus support and pay for the higher labor mobility. The model com-
bines an egalitarian ambition with support for reinforced dynamic re-
structuring in order to maintain competitiveness, a higher growth rate, and
higher wages.
When the negative social consequences of the higher mobility (regional
unemployment, disparate regional economic development and unemploy-
ment, increasing geographic concentration of jobs to the largest ﬁrms’
plants) became too costly politically in the early 1970s, the labor market
policies changed from encouraging mobility to supporting lock-in of em-
ployees with the current employer as the new labor market legislation fo-
cused on job tenure. At the same time the overall unemployment rate
tended to increase because of the stiﬀer international competition.
9.2.4 The Result: The Swedish Model
The Social Democrats accepted the private control of the largest ﬁrms
while the leading capitalists accepted their political dominance. Based on
mutual acceptance, an elaborate cooperation in corporatist spirit devel-
oped around large infrastructural and industrial projects that beneﬁted the
largest export-oriented ﬁrms in engineering and manufacturing. Tax-
based policies were put in place to stimulate a high investment level, par-
ticularly in the transnational ﬁrms, by subsidizing investments in machin-
ery, buildings, and R&D, and to give priority to retained earnings and bank
loans as the major sources for ﬁnancing—institutionalized saving in col-
lective funds. Labor market relations are peaceful and cooperative but with
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stimulated and supported a high growth rate and propagated the estab-
lished large-scale industrial ﬁrms with concentrated private ownership but
deliberately ignored the formation of new ﬁrms and the importance of
small ﬁrms: a dynamic but aging social economy with a large public sector.
9.2.5 More Radical Policies to Implement Economic Democracy
Profound political, social, and economic changes designate the years
around 1970 as the deﬁning moment for the Swedish model; what might be
termed its Golden Age came to an end, and its negative eﬀects became all
too apparent in a very short space of time. In response to very ﬁerce cri-
tique against the political incumbency, both from within and from outside
the labor movement, LO and SAP became more radical by proposing
strongly egalitarian policies with more redistribution of incomes and op-
portunities via the public sector that grew very fast during the 1970s and
resulted in the highest taxes in the world.12 More than half of the average
income was paid in taxes, but a signiﬁcant part was directly paid back to
the households through redistribution programs, in particular to families
with children, students, and pensioners, but also indirectly as subsidized
consumption. At the party congress in 1975 Olof Palme initiated the third
stage of the historical agenda: economic democracy. The timing could
hardly have been worse: the Bretton Woods system—the anchor of the
strongly interventionist economic policies with control over capital
ﬂows—was collapsing, and the oil crises had triggered the deepest eco-
nomic crises since the 1930s. The new constitution adopted in 1973 used
strictly proportional elections (which tend to and did breed unstable mi-
nority governments), and SAP was about to lose the 1976 election after
forty-four years in power.
The basic principle of nonintervention by the government in labor mar-
ket relations was abandoned in 1974 with the Employment Security Act
(LAS), which was written and enacted in response to direct demands from
LO. It provided employees with an elaborate protection against dismissal
and application of a strict last in–ﬁrst out principle (LIFO); the only two
legal grounds for dismissal were gross misconduct and redundancies. The
1976 Codetermination Act granted labor union representatives (strict mi-
nority) board representation. The laws were designed with the conditions
of the largest ﬁrms in mind, and the needs and demands of small ﬁrms for
more ﬂexible adjustment were ignored. Since tenure to the current em-
ployer became more important for job security than actual skills and eﬀort
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12. In retrospect, perhaps the most important event was the long, bitter, and very politi-
cized illegal strike in the North in 1969 against poor and unequal working conditions in the
mines of the state-run corporation LKAB. It triggered a ﬁerce debate with uncompromising
critique against the political incumbency as it made the inequalities visible (see Korpi 1978
and Hedborg and Meidner 1984).with the LIFO principle, the costs of dynamic mismatches increased, both
in the general labor market and within the ﬁrms, as workers de facto be-
came more locked in with ﬁrms. To alleviate the higher costs of LAS for
small ﬁrms, new and more ﬂexible rules were enacted in 1997.13
But the most radical proposal was the 1976 decision by the LO congress
to implement Ernst Wigforss’s vision of social ﬁrms without owners by a
gradual transfer of ownership of all ﬁrms with more than ﬁfty employees
to wage-earner funds with trade union and other stakeholder representa-
tives collectively exercising the funds’ voting and other ownership rights.
The actual transfer of shares would occur by private placements to the
funds corresponding to 20 percent of the ﬁrm’s annual proﬁt (Meidner
1978). The more proﬁtable the ﬁrm was, the faster the transfer of control—
at a proﬁt rate of 10 percent it took thirty-ﬁve years for a fund to establish
a majority control. Consistent with the established line of ideas, the fund’s
capital would stay within the ﬁrm and not be reallocated. The combined
eﬀect of the labor market laws and wage-earner funds would thus be an
even stronger lock-in of both capital and labor within ﬁrms.
The proposal had the lukewarm support of the SAP leadership and was
the catalyst that united all members and organizations to the right of the
labor movement in the most vociferous protests ever. A watered-down and
rather tame version was enacted in 1984 after the Social Democrats re-
turned to power in 1982, but was abolished by the Center-Right govern-
ment in 1992 and not reintroduced by subsequent Social Democratic gov-
ernments.14 The controversy over wage-earner funds is the only time that
private ownership has been really questioned. The debate has been silent
since then.
9.2.6 The Orthogonal Trajectory Away from Economic Democracy
It is fair to assume that outside observers of Swedish society around
1980 would have predicted a bumpy road ahead to economic democracy
with more interventionism and stronger political control over the econ-
omy. But the real historical irony is that the actual trajectory chosen by the
Social Democrats when returning to power was orthogonal to the conjec-
tured one, as it entailed a radical break with past policies: far-reaching
deregulation of the banking system, dismantling of capital ﬂow controls,
546 Peter Högfeldt
13. For example, by the use of prearranged temporary employment contracts all ﬁrms have
the unconditional right to employ up to ﬁve persons for a maximum of one year; the possi-
bility for local collective contracts to replace the stipulations in the law and sidestep the LIFO
principle in case of dismissal; annul the right of reemployment for dismissed workers and to
extend the temporary employment beyond a year. In case of redundancies, ﬁrms with no more
than ten employees are allowed to except two workers from the LIFO principle by a new law
in 2001.
14. The ﬁve wage-earner funds were ﬁnanced by a 0.2 percent payroll tax and a 20 percent
tax on real proﬁts above SEK 1 million during seven years. When abolished the funds’ capi-
tal was distributed to research and venture capital funds to promote new ﬁrms.privatization of state-owned ﬁrms and policies that promoted market com-
petitiveness, and reactivation of equity markets that were liberalized with
unrestricted foreign ownership of shares. The chosen road led to more
market economy, not to more socialism.
A similar radical across-the-board break with the old also happened in
France with a Socialist government (see Helleiner 1994). Given the cen-
tralist nature of both Swedish and French political governance structures,
the turnaround behavior is broadly consistent with Rajan and Zingales’s
(2003a,b) political theory of incumbency.15 But perhaps a more direct in-
terpretation of the Swedish case is that it shows the profoundly pragmatic
character of an encompassing party that has been heavily entrenched for
decades and almost inseparable from the state bureaucracy: to win elec-
tions in order to exercise power is the primary objective. But to win elec-
tions the economy has to be in order. The very radical change of policies
was perceived as necessary to get the economy in order and promote
growth.
9.2.7 Necessary Condition for the Swedish Model of Corporate
Ownership: Organized Labor and Capital
One important part of the Swedish model of corporate ownership is that
it presupposed the existence of two identiﬁable, well-organized parties—
labor and capital—that both had a political and a trade-based, corpora-
tive representation. At one level it is of course trivial to characterize the so-
ciety as corporatist, but why did it become corporatist, and why was it so
important, in particular for the Social Democrats?16 My answer pinpoints
both external (exogenous) and ideological factors. The fact that industrial
production was comparatively capital intensive and organized in relatively
few, large, and geographically concentrated units in ﬁrms controlled by
families and part of networks around the leading banks facilitated organi-
zation of both employers and employees. So did the smallness of the cul-
turally homogeneous society, and the fact that industrialization came rela-
tively late but was then very fast. The other crucial exogenous factor was
the strongly export-oriented character of the largest ﬁrms, which made
both capital and labor heavily dependent on the business cycles and fos-
tered a sense of ﬁghting the economic elements together. For example, af-
ter the deep crisis in the early 1920s, the strategies of both SAP and LO
changed to become less adversarial and more focused on employment and
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15. Henrekson and Jakobsson (2003a,b) present an alternative interpretation that empha-
sizes the break in policies but does not provide a consistent explanation, as they seem to ar-
gue that the threat from Socialism is as unrelenting as ever.
16. Reiter (2003) argues that the crucial importance of Saltsjöbadsavtalet 1938 was that “it
gave the Social Democratic Party an identiﬁable counter-party in the country’s export-
oriented industrialization and the construction of the welfare state” but does not provide any
arguments or theory that explains why.higher wages, which during the long, unprecedented expansion since the
1890s had been taken for granted.
The ideological factor is the idea that labor and capital are the two nat-
ural adversaries in a capitalistic economy but that capitalists are crucial for
the development of an advanced social democracy because of their strate-
gic control over investments and thereby growth in the private sector. It was
thus not inconsistent with the Social Democratic ideology to accept and
respect (at least for the time being) private ownership, and even reinforce
the entrenchment of well-deﬁned private owners by political support for
the use of dual-class shares and pyramiding. In exchange, the capitalists
did not move their capital or refuse to invest but accepted the political su-
premacy, in particular since it involved an elaborate and proﬁtable collab-
oration with the government and the unions. The objective of social ﬁrms
without owners could thus be implemented (at least partially) via negotia-
tions between the ﬁrms’ two major stakeholders with the (often passive)
support of the government (state). The fact that both the workers and the
leading capitalists already were united in encompassing national and cen-
tralized organizations that stressed overriding goals facilitated consensus-
based outcomes, which ﬁtted the ideological view that society is progres-
sively changed via many small and peaceful steps.
This combination of exogenous and ideological factors does not ﬁt the
political (nonideological) theory of Pagano and Volpin (2004) of a corpo-
ratist political equilibrium where low investor protection that beneﬁts con-
trolling owners is exchanged for high employment protection for labor.
This outcome is more likely under a proportional voting system, as it fos-
ters the formation of homogeneous blocks of voters, in particular if the
wealth distribution is unequal or the production technology has low capi-
tal intensity.17The listed ﬁrms in Sweden did, however, (on average) use rel-
atively capital-intensive technologies and were primarily dependent on
banks for their ﬁnancing, not on equity ﬁnancing as their theory seems to
suggest. The strong dependence on a relation-based banking system thus
implies that neither an unequal wealth distribution nor low-capital-
intensity technologies are necessary conditions.18 Interestingly, only since
the Swedish voting system became fully proportional in 1973 have govern-
ments without the participation of the Social Democratic Party been
formed for the ﬁrst time since 1932.
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17. “The intuition behind this result is that proportional voting pushes political parties to
cater more to the preferences of social groups with homogeneous preferences, that is, entre-
preneurs and employees. This is because under this voting rule the additional mass of voters
that can be attracted by shifting a party’s platform is greater if the shift favors a homogeneous
constituency” (Pagano and Volpin 2004).
18. In a more literal sense it is also diﬃcult to imagine that shareholder minority protection
should be on the top of the minds of controlling owners and that workers should have any rea-
son to develop preferences about such protection—in particular since they did not own any
shares and stock markets were closed down at the time when corporatism reigned.The one-sided emphasis on equity markets, in particular on the primary
function, in theories of political economy of corporate ownership (gover-
nance) is diﬃcult to reconcile with the limited dependence of such markets
in Continental Europe for most of the previous century. Ownership is not
more concentrated there because of weaker legal protection of minority
shareholders, as the theory seems to presuppose (see also Burkart, Pa-
nunzi, and Shleifer 2003), but primarily because of political support for the
use of mechanisms to separate votes from capital (dual-class shares, cross-
shareholdings, and pyramiding; see Holmén and Högfeldt 2004a). Politi-
cally motivated concessions, both to the government and to the workers,
are easier to obtain when ﬁrms have a well-deﬁned private owner in control
as they are visible in the public arena. It is therefore not surprising that con-
centrated private ownership seems to cluster with well-organized labor
unions and formation of major parties along the left-right spectrum.
Rather than focusing on formal minority protection, it seems more natural
to pinpoint the political support for concentrated ownership built on sep-
aration of ownership from control and determine how this systematically
aﬀects corporate ﬁnancing and worker protection.
I sum up this section by answering one of my main questions: why did the
Social Democrats not only accept but de facto support that control of the
large listed ﬁrms and of the pivotal banks remained in private hands? A pos-
sible and plausible answer has three parts. First, the party’s ideologically
and economically pivotal objective to inﬂuence or control the large listed
ﬁrms’ investment behavior could be achieved through means that did not
assume the eclipse of private ownership. Second, since old family fortunes
remained within the ﬁrms as working capital and became foundations (in-
stitutions) because of the tax policies, the private capital in eﬀect became
more social and institutionalized, in particular the bank capital; the re-
maining “private” character of capital was not a primary problem. More-
over, since formation of large, private fortunes in newly founded ﬁrms via
equity ﬁnancing was limited and controlled by tax policies and regulations,
the wealth distribution did not threaten to become too dispersed.
Third, implementation of the Social Democrats’ social agenda did not
necessitate a takeover of control of large listed private ﬁrms but could be
realized through reforms and policies that redistributed resources and op-
portunities via the public sector with strong and persistent electoral sup-
port. Their more radical agenda for economic democracy, on the other
hand, was more ideological and abstract and did not generate enough pop-
ular support. Besides more tactical considerations, the heavy and un-
precedented entrenchment of the party in general and the fact that indi-
vidual careers are closely tied to being in control of the public bureaucracy
in particular de facto narrowed the primary objective to winning elections
to remain in power and running the economy in a competent and stable
way to ﬁnance reforms.
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Why did corporate ownership in Sweden not separate widely, as in the
Anglo-Saxon countries? The leading answer in the literature would be that
it was because of weak formal minority protection (see, e.g., La Porta et al.
2000 and Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer 2003). Good protection encour-
agesboth outsiders to invest and founding families to sell out a larger frac-
tion in an IPO since formal rules limit extraction of pecuniary beneﬁts by
management when the ﬁrm becomes widely held; both factors stimulate
development of advanced ﬁnancial markets. Lower protection thus causes
founders to maintain a larger fraction of shares to avoid being exploited,
which predicts a negative relation between formal minority protection on
the one hand, and ownership concentration and size of (pecuniary) private
beneﬁts of controlling owners, respectively, on the other. But this line of
reasoning does not square well with the history and politics of corporate
ownership in Sweden for several reasons.
The empirical estimates of Dyck and Zingales (2004) suggest that, con-
trary to predictions, the size of private beneﬁts in Sweden are of about the
same size as in the Anglo-Saxon countries that are perceived to have a bet-
ter formal (legal) minority protection. In particular, there is no positive re-
lationship between ownership concentration and size of private beneﬁts
or a negative relation with the level of minority protection (see Holmén
and Högfeldt 2004a). Inconsistent with the leading theory, the only legal
regime dummy that is signiﬁcant is the negative coeﬃcient (lower private
beneﬁts) for Scandinavian origin. Other behavioral factors that are related
to the culture and norms of the society, like degree of tax compliance, level
of corruption, openness, and crime rates, eliminate the explanatory power
of legal regimes and of level of minority protection (see Dyck and Zingales
2004). Stock market capitalization in relation to GDP, number of listed
ﬁrms per million inhabitants, frequency of IPOs, and household frequency
of equity ownership (around 55–60 percent) are if not higher at least com-
parable to the Anglo-Saxon countries and higher than for Continental Eu-
rope (see Holmén and Högfeldt 2004a). The potential for transfer of cor-
porate assets to the controlling owners is perhaps largest in pyramiding,
but unlike Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002) for Indian pyra-
mids, Holmén and Högfeldt (2004b) ﬁnd no evidence of tunneling in Swe-
dish pyramids.
Lack of minority protection did not hinder the development of active ﬁ-
nancial markets before WWI (see Rajan and Zingales 2003a). Neither was
it a prerequisite for the stock market boom in recent decades, as protec-
tion was improved in the early 1990s after public scandals involving 
self-dealings, particularly in management-controlled ﬁrms with cross-
shareholdings. The diﬀerences in formal minority protection between ad-
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cies in ownership concentration; see also Roe (2002a,b).
Implicitly, the leading explanation seems to assume that the size of
private beneﬁts of control is larger if the ﬁrm becomes listed than if it re-
mains privately held because of the pecuniary extraction from minority
shareholders. But the two most successful ﬁrms in Sweden founded after
WWII—IKEA (founded by Ingvar Kamprad) and Tetra Laval (the Raus-
ing family)—have both (aggressively) avoided going public with the ex-
plicit argument that their private value of control would be diluted, both
because of the listing (information and transparency) requirements, and
since their long-run strategy (patiently building an empire) may be com-
promised by the perceived myopic character of the stock market. The third
most successful ﬁrm, H&M (an international chain of clothing stores
founded by Erling Persson), went public in the 1970s in order to ﬁnance its
future growth, in particular its international expansion. But since H&M
has consistently generated high enough proﬁts to fully ﬁnance its invest-
ments by retained earnings, Stefan Persson, the head of the family and
chairman of the board (former CEO), has oﬃcially announced that the
family regrets the listing, saying it would have been better to stay private.
Private beneﬁts of control may thus have less to do with pecuniary extrac-
tion of minority shareholders than with the value of being in control
(power) per se, which is maximized when staying fully private. Since a
public listing dilutes the private beneﬁts of control, a family-controlled
ﬁrm goes public only when it needs new capital. More generally, Holmén
and Högfeldt (2004a) ﬁnd that Swedish IPO ﬁrms in general, but family
ﬁrms in particular, have a strong preference for maintained control, and
their behavior is consistent with the control theories (see Bebchuk 1999
and Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis 1999).
9.3.1 Roe’s Political Theory
Mark Roe’s alternative political theory that ownership does not separate
widely in Continental Europe since it is not politically and socially accept-
able in the Social Democracies is summarized in his Clarendon Lectures
(Roe 2002a):
It [ownership] is concentrated in no small measure because the delicate
threads that tie managers to shareholders in the public ﬁrm fray easily in
common political environments, such as those in the Continental Euro-
pean social democracies. Social democracies press managers to stabilize
employment, to forgo some proﬁt-maximizing risks with the ﬁrm, and to
use up capital in place rather than downsize when markets no longer are
aligned with the ﬁrm’s production capabilities. Since managers must
have discretion in the public ﬁrm, how they use that discretion is crucial
to stockholders, and social democratic pressures induce managers to
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goals. A crucial political prerequisite to the rise of the public ﬁrm in the
United States is the weakness of social democratic pressures on the
American business ﬁrm.
The dual side of this compelling set of arguments is thus that Social
Democracies in Roe’s wider sense presuppose concentrated corporate
ownership but will be less eﬃcient as necessary changes are delayed or do
not take place. The ﬁrst implication is generally in line with my arguments,
but the second one does not ﬁt the history and politics of corporate own-
ership in Sweden, perhaps the quintessential Social Democratic society,
very well. For example, Roe’s arguments do not recognize the pivotal eﬀect
in a small open economy of the international competitive exposure on la-
bor market relations and conditions within the ﬁrm. Being determined by
outside conditions, it is perceived as an objective, exogenous factor that de-
ﬁnes the necessary adjustments and limits the set of possible actions in or-
der to remain competitive and be paid a higher wage in the current or in an-
other job. As an encompassing union, the well-established tradition within
the LO has been not to ﬁght changes motivated by rational economic ar-
guments but to accept and actually facilitate them in order for the whole
economy to maintain its competitiveness and growth. In fact, the general
economic policy, in particular the labor market policies, that the Social De-
mocrats pursued with the active backing of the LO were at least until the
1970s very growth oriented, as they stimulated structural changes and ra-
tionalizations, promoted labor mobility, and provided ambitious retrain-
ing and educational programs for the unemployed. Local unions may voice
protests but are not known to obstruct or aggressively ﬁght back if negoti-
ations about layoﬀs and close-downs are done in an orderly manner. Look-
ing through the Swedish lens, Roe ignores the crucial importance of a
public sector that provides an outside protection via insurance, education,
and beneﬁt programs that assuages the hardships of unemployment, which
seems to facilitate rather than obstruct necessary economic changes.
Despite corporatist tendencies and a spirit of cooperation, the adversar-
ial interests of labor and capital have not been mixed and diluted by code-
termination since unions did not get legal rights to elect board representa-
tives until the 1970s. It is a strict minority representation; there are no dual
boards, and unions have no right to veto a ﬁrm’s decisions. Unlike in Ger-
many, codetermination was not designed to appease aggressive unions and
to ﬁght social and political instability. Moreover, the general rule has been
that politicians should not intervene but let the representatives of labor
and capital settle disputes and other matters by negotiations.
Overall, Mark Roe paints a picture in too stark colors that exaggerates
the diﬀerences between Continental Europe and the United States by im-
plying that necessary economic adjustments will not be eﬃciently imple-
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ciency-enhancing changes will be undertaken but in a diﬀerent, more or-
derly, and fair manner, perhaps somewhat delayed due to negotiations but
often with more far-reaching consequences when they occur.20 The eﬀect
of international exposure, a large welfare sector, and diﬀerent labor mar-
ket institutions (encompassing, well-organized unions) and ownership
structures leads to outcomes that diﬀer perhaps more in form than in sub-
stance. The more negative institutional aspects of the Scandinavian model
are the signiﬁcant lock-in eﬀects of both labor (e.g., strict application of
the LIFO rule) and capital within the old, established ﬁrms that will be
stable and relatively eﬃcient while the addition of new growing ﬁrms will
be hampered.
9.3.2 An Alternative Political Theory of Why 
Ownership Does Not Separate Widely
My analysis of the history of Swedish corporate ownership, however,
suggests another political theory as to why ownership does not separate
widely: listed ﬁrms do not have to disperse ownership and dilute private
beneﬁts of control in order to raise new capital since their dependence on
the equity market is limited because of political decisions and institutional
factors. This is particularly true for the largest listed ﬁrms with well-
established networks. The focus is on the equity markets’ primary func-
tion—provision of capital—and its political sensitivity, not on liquidity
provision. The basic idea is that political decisions will determine how de-
pendent ﬁrms are on external ﬁnancing: if capital for investments can be
supplied primarily through retained earnings, by borrowing in banks, or by
infusion of private capital, ﬁrms have no immediate need to go through the
strictures of equity oﬀers and place a larger fraction of shares in a wider
group of investors and dilute private beneﬁts of control in the process.
My political theory of corporate ﬁnancing starts with the assumption
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19. Roe’s arguments presuppose that shareholder value maximization has consistently been
the single, hard objective in the United States while the ﬁrm’s objective has been diluted by
stakeholder concerns in Europe. A reasonable interpretation is that because of primarily po-
litical reasons maximization of shareholder value has been accepted only in certain time pe-
riods in the United States but not uniformly, and that the importance of stakeholder value in
Europe has also varied substantially with the political tides. Implicit in Mark Roe’s theory
about the negative eﬀects of Social Democracy is also the idea that the relation between labor
and management is more adversarial than that between labor and controlling owners. If any-
thing, however, the Swedish experience seems to suggest that the union representatives are
closer to the management and that the relations are based on consensus and trust as long as
the ﬁrm pursues a reliable long-term strategy.
20. An illustrative example is the dramatic downsizing of Ericsson in recent years from
110,000 employees worldwide to less than 50,000. A signiﬁcant fraction of the employees
worked in Sweden, but very few if any protests were voiced, as it was done in an orderly, ne-
gotiated way. The unions did not obstruct but helped to accommodate the changes, as they
were perceived as necessary in order for Ericsson to survive in the long run.that corporate control based on separation of control from ownership via
mechanisms to separate votes from capital, like dual-class shares and pyra-
miding, presupposes political support to be socially acceptable. In the
Swedish case, the political legitimacy of entrenched private ownership is
traded oﬀ against the implicit guarantee that the largest listed ﬁrms do not
migrate and that they continue to invest, thereby generating economic re-
sources to ﬁnance the political reform agenda. The separation of control
from ownership has a profound eﬀect on corporate ﬁnancing, however, as
it drives a signiﬁcant wedge between the costs of internal and external cap-
ital. New external shareholders demand compensation (discounts) for the
agency costs inherent in the separation, which makes external equity more
expensive. Shareholders seem to attach signiﬁcant discounts to privately
controlled ﬁrms using dual-class shares (10–15 percent) and to pyramid
holding companies (25–30 percent) to separate votes from capital (see
Holmén and Högfeldt 2004b). But internal capital is relatively inexpensive
for the controlling owners since they have access to all of the ﬁrm’s cash
ﬂows via a small (less than proportional) capital investment.
The wedge caused by the separation of control from ownership therefore
generates an enhanced (political) pecking order of ﬁnancing: strong re-
liance on retained earnings and borrowing but avoidance of equity issues,
in particular of large public oﬀers, as they would dilute control and also be
extra costly due to the discounts to new outside shareholders (see Holmén
and Högfeldt 2004b). The pecking order is enhanced since it is caused by
agency costs inherent to the ownership structure and not primarily by
asymmetric information costs, and since it predicts the absence or strong
avoidance of public oﬀers (see Högfeldt and Oborenko 2004). This is the
key mechanism that explains why ﬁrms in countries with prevalent use of
dual-class shares and pyramiding like Sweden have more concentrated
ownership but are also much less dependent on the primary equity markets
and why they do not need to disperse ownership.
The connection between the politics of corporate ownership and ﬁnanc-
ing is particularly conspicuous in the regulation of banks’ ownership of
equity since the 1930s. When the Swedish version of the Glass-Steagal Act
was enacted in 1934, commercial banks were no longer allowed to directly
own shares in other ﬁrms (a right granted them in 1911 because of pivotal
support from the Social Democrats). Reﬂecting the strong political and
economic interests of leading bankers but with the support of the Social
Democrats, banks were, however, allowed a few years later to transfer their
portfolios of controlling interests to holding companies that were organ-
ized as CEIFs and distribute the funds’ shares to the banks’ existing share-
holders. The controlling owners of the commercial banks at the apex of the
pyramid thus controlled the largest ﬁrms at the bottom via CEIFs at the in-
termediary level that were listed. Since pyramiding was combined with use
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plicative.
The new laws in eﬀect made two dominating banks (SEB and Svenska
Handelsbanken) the controlling owners of the largest listed ﬁrms, and
bank loans the major way to ﬁnance the ﬁrms’ investments besides re-
tained earnings, in particular in the decades when the equity markets were
dormant. Corporate control was therefore via political decisions directly
linked to the control over intermediated capital, which tend to make equity
ﬁnancing much less likely. Unlike in the United States, the pyramids were
politically supported via the tax system: intercorporate dividends as well
as reinvested capital gains were de facto tax exempt (see Holmén and
Högfeldt 2004b). Since this preferential tax treatment is pivotal for the ex-
istence of pyramids (see Morck 2003), it is the critical element in the Social
Democrats’ consistent support of the very heavy entrenched private own-
ership of the largest listed ﬁrms in Sweden. It is perhaps also the very rea-
son why capital did not migrate.
More generally, since for ideological reasons the Social Democrats fo-
cused on the largest established ﬁrms and supported both retained earn-
ings via tax beneﬁts and a relation-based banking system, the two major
ways to ﬁnance investments both had strong political support. They were
also in general very skeptical toward the turbulent equity markets that are
conducive to economic and social changes, which is antithetical to their
political ambitions to provide stability and social reforms in an orderly,
planned manner. But for egalitarian reasons they were, and still are, even
more skeptical toward the equity markets’ primary function. The combi-
nation of entrepreneurship and equity ﬁnancing will facilitate creation of
large private fortunes and break the social status quo—that is, it will limit
the possibilities for social control and for redistribution. Since a well-
functioning primary market will widen the income distribution but in par-
ticular the distribution of wealth and ownership of assets, new equity issues
have consistently been disfavored by a tax disadvantage. Reactive ﬁnanc-
ing via retained earnings that beneﬁts incumbent owners by locking in the
capital in the existing ﬁrms was preferred to a more proactive and aggres-
sive ﬁnancing mode via the primary equity market, which is more likely to
implement faster and more drastic changes that are likely to challenge the
incumbents’ power. This outcome is also the most likely since the new en-
trepreneurs and ﬁrms lack political power while the well-organized incum-
bents are united by common interests and have political voice.
As long as this closely integrated system of ownership and ﬁnancing is
stable, ﬁrms do not need to raise substantial amounts of new capital from
the equity markets. And when ﬁrms were highly leveraged in the 1970s and
needed more equity capital as both proﬁts and credits were squeezed and
more restructuring takeovers occurred, there was strong political support
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shares to separate votes from capital contribution in order to maintain
control also after issues of equity.21 Hence, for a combination of political
and institutional reasons, ownership does not separate widely since listed
ﬁrms are not directly dependent on equity markets to ﬁnance their invest-
ments.
My alternative political theory of corporate ﬁnancing has several
testable implications. The ﬁrst one is that the very entrenched and relation-
based banking system will block the development of arm’s-length markets
for corporate bonds; if they exist they will not be well developed. Hence, it
should not come as a surprise that there are no domestic corporate bond
markets in Sweden and that the largest listed ﬁrms use the international
bond markets, but only to a limited extent.
The second prediction of the theory is that the volume of IPOs and sea-
soned equity oﬀerings [SEOs] on average should be very small. Figure 9.4
shows that the annual volume (2002 prices) of new equity and bond issues
on average corresponds to about 10 percent of gross domestic capital for-
mation before 1931 but averages only about 1 percent since then. The peak
in 1917–18 is a result of the speculative war economy fuelled by excessive
buying of new issues by the highly leveraged and bank-aﬃliated issuing
companies before they were forced to close down after the deep ﬁnancial
crises in the early 1920s (Fritz 1990 and Östlind 1944).22 During 1927–29
Ivar Kreuger capitalized heavily on the exuberant market sentiments by is-
suing equity and, in particular, debentures (unsecured bonds) both do-
mestically and internationally to save his highly leveraged and very opaque
empire before it collapsed after he shot himself in Paris in 1932 and trig-
gered the worst ﬁnancial crises in Sweden.
The more recent peak in 1992 around 5 percent is the result of extremely
low investments due to very high interest rates in the wake of the second-
worst ﬁnancial crises when a speculative real estate bubble burst. It was fu-
elled by excessive credit expansion by the recently deregulated banks. The
large volume in 1999 is, of course, due to a record number of information
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21. The legislators’ motivation for the use of dual-class shares in the new corporate law
(Proposition 1997/98:99, p. 120; my translation) illustrates the political support: “The use of
shares with diﬀerent voting rights has a long tradition in Swedish law. Dual-class shares are
very common among listed companies in Sweden. The dual-class share system has signiﬁcant
advantages. It makes it possible (facilitates) to have a strong and stable ownership function
even in very large companies, thereby creating the necessary conditions for an eﬃcient man-
agement as well as for the long-term planning of the ﬁrm’s activities. Shares with diﬀerent vot-
ing rights also facilitate for growing companies to raise new capital without the original own-
ers losing control. There is no evidence that the dual-class share system has caused any
noticeable negative eﬀe c t s ....   Dual-class shares can signiﬁcantly promote the eﬃciency and
development of individual ﬁrms as well as of the business sector in general.”
22. The SEO volume in 1917–18 corresponds to about 2.5 percent of the total stock market
value, while the volume in 1927–29 is about 7 percent of the market cap.technology (IT)–related IPOs, particularly related to mobile internet and
IT-based services. For comparative purposes, the table does not include the
30 billion SEK rights issue in 2002 by the ﬁnancially distressed Ericsson
since it is the largest SEO ever. It is particularly interesting to note that this
single issue corresponds to 13 percent of the total volume of all SEOs (2002
prices) during the last 100 years, 25 percent of all SEOs since 1970, and 40
percent of all SEOs during the exuberant 1990s (about 10 billion dollars).
The listed ﬁrms’ dependence on the equity markets for new capital has thus
been very limited indeed in Sweden.
Because of the strong preference for control, in particular among fam-
ily ﬁrms, a third implication is that dual-class shares should be used very
frequently and that SEOs should follow a speciﬁc pecking order ranked
by the extent to which they dilute control: ﬁrst rights issues, then private
placements, followed by directed issues (stock-ﬁnanced acquisitions),
and ﬁnally public oﬀers that are strongly avoided. Moreover, the issues
should be relatively small and only oﬀer low voting B-shares. Rights is-
sues should have the largest size since they dilute control the least. The
empirical evidence from 233 IPOs between 1980 and 1997 in Holmén and
Högfeldt (2004a) and from Swedish SEOs since 1984 in Högfeldt and
Oborenko (2004) are consistent with this implication, since almost 90
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Fig. 9.4 Seasoned equity oﬀering (SEO) activity in Sweden 1902–2002: Relative
to gross domestic capital formation (GDCF)
Sources: For 1902–87 Althaimer (1988), and for 1988–2002 Holmén and Högfeldt (2004b).percent of the privately controlled IPO ﬁrms use dual-class shares and
there is a well-deﬁned pecking order of SEOs. In particular, the amounts
raised are very small, and rights issues are by far the largest. The fastest-
growing IPO ﬁrms are controlled by the founder/entrepreneur and ﬁ-
nance their expansion by rights issues, normally within eighteen months
after the listing.23
It is particularly interesting to observe the absence of public oﬀers,
which are both the most common and the largest oﬀers in the United States
but infrequently used outside the Anglo-Saxon countries. Relatively large
public oﬀers are especially important in the ﬁnancing of newly founded
ﬁrms that grow very quickly (“gazelles”). But they are also instrumental to
disperse ownership widely at and after the IPO. The very infrequent use of
public oﬀers may thus explain both why ownership does not disperse
widely and why very few young ﬁrms grow to become really large in Swe-
den. To understand why public oﬀers are uncommon in, say, civil law coun-
tries may also explain why ﬁnancial markets in general and primary equity
markets in particular are less developed there.24 My theory suggests that
because of the politically supported control structure combined with the
strong preference for maintained private control, public oﬀers are last in
the enhanced pecking order since by their larger size they dilute control the
most and are most costly because of the required discounts to new share-
holders.
More generally, my theory predicts the following stylized facts about the
corporate system cluster: (a) concentrated ownership because of extensive
use of devices to separate votes form capital; (b) secondary markets rela-
tively well developed if dual-class shares are frequently used (B-shares pro-
vide liquidity) but primary markets particularly politically vulnerable and
underdeveloped; (c) equity ﬁnancing of investments far less important
than borrowing and use of retained earnings (small volume of IPOs and
SEOs) and limited market timing; (d) pecking order also of SEOs, with
rights issues (largest) and private placements most frequent while public
oﬀers are absent or exceptionally few; (e) very few young ﬁrms grow fast to
become really large; (f) undeveloped markets for corporate bonds (due to
the strong relation-based banking system); and (g) relatively equal distri-
bution of wealth and income. Because the separation of ownership from
control drives a wedge between the costs of internal and external capital,
my theory predicts that ﬁrms controlled by pyramids or via extensive use
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23. If the founders relinquish control, they do so by selling their control block before the
IPO but keep the block intact both at the IPO and afterwards until they sell it. Family-
controlled ﬁrms often ﬁnance relatively small acquisitions by issuing B-shares (see Holmén
and Högfeldt 2004b and Högfeldt and Oborenko 2004).
24. Even if trading volumes and market caps are less developed than in the Anglo-Saxon
countries because of the extensive use of dual-class shares, the liquidity provided by trading
of B-shares may still be large: the number of IPOs is not necessarily small since dual-class
shares facilitate maintained family control after the IPO and stock-ﬁnanced acquisitions.of dual-class shares will have higher investment–cash ﬂow sensitivities; see
Holmén and Högfeldt (2004b) for supporting empirical evidence.
The reasons why ownership did not separate widely in Sweden are thus
according to my theory profoundly political: use of dual-class shares and
pyramiding, which are politically supported, drives a wedge between the
costs of internal and external capital that causes an enhanced (political)
pecking order of corporate ﬁnancing. The political support for separation
of control from ownership and for nonequity ﬁnancing beneﬁts established
ﬁrms and in eﬀect aligns the interests of the incumbent political power with
incumbent capital (in particular the leading banks) as corporate control is
maintained and actually reinforced—despite increasing needs for new
capital—while formation and growth of new ﬁrms by equity ﬁnancing are
eﬀectively disfavored for egalitarian reasons.
9.4 A Critical Evaluation of the Swedish Model of Corporate Ownership
At this point it is convenient to oversimplify and pinpoint three con-
stituent parts of the Swedish model of corporate ownership. The ﬁrst is
the primarily exogenous character of production: capital-intensive, large-
scale, export-oriented production (raw materials, manufacturing, and en-
gineering) by relatively few large, transnational, and privately controlled
ﬁrms. The second is the changing international market conditions due to
political, economic (competition), and technological factors. The ﬁnal is
the endogenous eﬀects of prolonged Social Democratic policies. We focus
on the long-run economic eﬀects by looking at the impact of three major
Social Democratic policies: (a) political support for a relation-based bank-
ing system and control of the largest listed ﬁrms via bank-controlled
closed-end investment funds; (b) political support for dual-class shares
and other devices to separate votes and capital in order to facilitate main-
tained private control with well-deﬁned owners despite increasing capital
needs and institutionalization of ownership; and (c) consistent political fo-
cus on the largest listed ﬁrms and strong preference for retained earnings
and bank loans as the major ways to ﬁnance investment while in particular
disfavoring equity ﬁnancing and equity markets in general. These policies
jointly create the foundation for the enhanced political pecking order of ﬁ-
nancing and have three major long-run eﬀects.
9.4.1 Overinvestment by Large Firms in Old Industries and
Underinvestment of New Firms in Growing Industries, Biased
Distribution of Firm Size and Age, and Lower Overall Growth
The strong dependence on retained earnings and debt in the enhanced
pecking order, reinforced by the preferential tax treatment, implies that
ﬁrms’ investment criterion has been systematically biased since past prof-
its to a signiﬁcant degree inﬂuence or determine the allocation of invest-
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and capital-intensive industries with large real assets that have consistently
been proﬁtable and are part of a leading bank’s network. But the policies
disfavor young ﬁrms in new lines of business based on human capital and
services with strong growth potential and in need of risk capital. Since in-
cumbent ﬁrms have access to relatively inexpensive internal capital while
new ﬁrms are hampered since they use the primary equity markets only to
a limited extent, the biased investment criterion is likely to create system-
atic under- and overinvestment problems that tend to have a negative eﬀect
on the overall growth in the economy. The largest ﬁrms that will tend to in-
vest too much are in mature industries with lower future growth potential,
while the new and smaller ﬁrms tend to invest too little and are likely to be
in lines of business with higher growth potential. These eﬀects are re-
inforced by the fact that, for control reasons, IPO ﬁrms are not inclined to
use large public oﬀers to grow fast, and older ﬁrms that ﬁnance their in-
vestments via retained earnings tend to have realized returns that are sig-
niﬁcantly below their cost of capital; investments ﬁnanced via debt or
equity do not seem to systematically underperform (see Holmén and
Högfeldt 2004b). The free cash ﬂow problem thus seems to be particularly
serious for ﬁrms that have a well-deﬁned owner in control and rely on re-
tained earnings; they also tend to have higher investment–cash ﬂow sensi-
tivity. Ineﬃcient investments due to (free) access to retained earnings may
be the very reason why ﬁrms with strong separation of control and owner-
ship are traded at a discount.
Since the labor market laws in recent decades have promoted tenure with
an employer, the combined eﬀect of investment and labor market policies
is therefore a signiﬁcant lock-in of both labor and capital within the exist-
ing large ﬁrms and their controlling owners. The biased investment crite-
rion and the lock-in eﬀects endogenously create stronger path dependency
as the ﬁrms’ future developments (size, investments, and growth) are more
directly tied to past performance. The long-run eﬀects on the ﬁrm structure
will be a survival and growth bias: an overrepresentation of very large and
old ﬁrms in mature industries and an underrepresentation of new and fast-
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25. The corporate and ownership tax policies are not the direct cause behind the enhanced
pecking order of ﬁnancing since they are primarily supportive of the ownership policies that
promote separation of control from ownership. The tax policies have at the margin disfavored
direct ownership by households and beneﬁted institutional ownership, and disfavored equity
as a source of capital, in particular when the inﬂation rate is high, while favoring debt and re-
tained earnings. Table 9.7 shows the eﬀective marginal tax rates for diﬀerent type of owners
and sources of ﬁnancing at points in time when taxes were revised. A negative marginal tax
rate indicates that the rate of return is greater than before: a marginal tax rate of –83 percent
for a debt-ﬁnanced investment by a tax-exempt institution transforms to 10 percent real re-
turn before tax to 18.3 percent return after tax. The taxes on debt, equity, and retained earn-
ings were rather diﬀerentiated before the big tax reform in 1991 but have become more
harmonized since then. Note that the most negative tax eﬀects on equity ownership by 
households occurred before 1985, when the equity markets were dormant in Sweden.growing ﬁrms in new industries. Broadly consistent with this conjecture,
Sweden has one of the most skewed distributions with an extreme domi-
nance of very large and very old multinational ﬁrms still controlled by In-
vestor and Industrivärden, and very limited addition of new fast-growing
ﬁrms. Figure 9.5 shows, for example, that thirty-one of the ﬁfty largest
ﬁrms in 2000 were founded before 1914. No ﬁrm founded after 1970 has
been added to the list. Moreover, measured by number of the Fortune 500
ﬁrms in 1991, Sweden ranked as number six with ﬁfteen ﬁrms on the list
and with the highest number of ﬁrms per GDP unit (one billion USD, pur-
chasing power parity adjusted): 0.104 (see Jagrén 1993). The size distribu-
tion of Swedish ﬁrms (small, medium, and large) is 84.1 percent, 12.1 per-
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Table 9.7 Eﬀective marginal tax rates for diﬀerent combinations of owners and
sources of ﬁnance in 1960, 1970, and 1980 (real pretax rate of return 10
percent at actual inﬂation rates) and in 1985, 1991, and 1999 at diﬀerent
inﬂations rates for listed ﬁrms
Debt New share issues Retained earnings
1960
Households 27.2 92.7 48.2
Tax-exempt institutions –32.2 31.4 31.2
Insurance companies –21.7 41.6 34.0
1970
Households 51.3 122.1 57.1
Tax-exempt institutions –64.8 15.9 32.7
Insurance companies –45.1 42.4 41.2
1980
Households 58.2 136.6 51.9
Tax-exempt institutions –83.4 –11.6 11.2
Insurance companies –54.9 38.4 28.7
1985
0% inﬂation rate 50.4 43.7 46.0
5% 75.0 87.6 58.8
10% 102.1 129.2 68.8
1991
0% inﬂation rate 29.0 17.6 40.3
5% 38.8 46.4 51.5
10% 47.7 76.6 60.4
1999
0% inﬂation rate 36.2 56.2 47.3
5% 49.1 79.2 60.2
10% 61.9 103.1 70.5
Source: Södersten (1984) and Öberg (2003).
Notes: All calculations are based on the actual asset composition in manufacturing and con-
formto the general framework developed by King and Fullerton (1984). The average holding
period is assumed to be ten years. A negative tax rate implies that the rate of return after tax
is greater than before tax. For instance, a tax rate of –83 percent for a debt-ﬁnanced invest-
ment owned by a tax-exempt institution in 1980 tells us that a real rate of return of 10 percent
before tax becomes 18.3 percent taking the tax eﬀects into account.cent, and 3.7 percent, respectively, compared to an international average
size distribution of 87.5 percent, 10.2 percent, and 2.2 percent, respec-
tively, which shows the bias toward larger ﬁrms (see Henrekson and Jakob-
sson 2001).
He, Morck, and Yeung (2003) ﬁnd that greater instability in the ranking
over time of a country’s largest ﬁrms is associated with faster economic
growth.26 Economic growth is thus more likely to be caused by the rise of
new large ﬁrms than by the prosperity of established large ﬁrms. Sweden
has one of the most stable rankings over time but really stands out in their
analysis as the only country where the continuity of control over time ac-
tually increases.27 That lock-in of family control for generations may have
negative eﬀects is a well-known phenomenon. For example, Holmén and
Högfeldt (2004b) report a robust 14 percent discount for large listed ﬁrms
that are heir controlled. The conjecture that incumbency tends to breed
complacency and stagnation, in particular when investments are ﬁnanced
via retained earnings, is consistent with Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung’s
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Fig. 9.5 Fifty largest ﬁrms in 2000 sorted by the period when they were founded
Source: NUTEK and ALMI (2001).
26. “The faster growth is primarily due to faster growth in total factor productivity in in-
dustrialized countries, and faster capital accumulation in developing countries” (He, Morck,
and Yeung 2003).
27. They observe a very interesting fact: “Note that control continuity is always less than
corporate stability, except in the case of Sweden. This is because the Wallenberg family took
control prior to 1996 of two new top ten ﬁrms that arose between 1975 and 1996. These two
new top ten ﬁrms thus have a continuity of control. This situation arises in no other country”
(He, Morck, and Yeung 2003).(2000) ﬁnding in a cross-country analysis that countries with a larger frac-
tion of heir-controlled ﬁrms tend to have a signiﬁcantly lower overall
growth rate. The dominance of the same ﬁrms among the very largest for
decades as well as the extreme continuity of control in Sweden is thus con-
sistent with a lower overall growth rate in the economy.
The strong path dependency is particularly conspicuous for the very im-
portant closed-end investment funds that control the largest listed ﬁrms,
since their shares trade at a signiﬁcant discount (on average 25–30 percent)
relative to their portfolio, which in eﬀect makes it economically impossible
for them to raise new equity capital via SEOs. The funds thus prefer that
their portfolio ﬁrms primarily ﬁnance their investments by retained earn-
ings and loans since these sources are relatively cheap, although the ﬁrms
are traded at a 10 percent discount because of being controlled via a pyra-
mid (see Holmén and Högfeldt 2004b). Since intercorporate dividends are
not taxed if they just pass through the pyramid holding company (the
closed-end investment fund) on their way from the portfolio ﬁrms to the ul-
timate shareholders, the controlling owners are even more inclined to re-
tain earnings in the portfolio ﬁrms. Since realized capital gains are not
taxed if reinvested, the pyramid holding companies avoid paying dividends
themselves. The combined eﬀect of the preferential tax treatment and the
pyramid control structure is therefore that the portfolio ﬁrms systemati-
cally pay out less dividends and tend to overinvest, which the signiﬁcantly
higher investment–cash ﬂow sensitivity and the signiﬁcantly lower realized
return on investments ﬁnanced via retained earnings for pyramid ﬁrms
shows (Holmén and Högfeldt 2004b). Moreover, since the two leading
banks are both controlling owners of the most important pyramids and the
major providers of loans to the portfolio ﬁrms, they tend to behave more
like bondholders: accumulating hidden reserves and choosing conservative
investment strategies that focus on long-run survival and stable cash ﬂows,
not on risk taking and entrepreneurship.
The lock-in eﬀect and the biased investment criterion have especially
negative long-run eﬀects since the portfolio ﬁrms are in old and often cap-
ital-intensive industries. In particular, these ﬁrms tend to invest heavily in
R&D, often along the narrow trajectory previously chosen by a specializ-
ing strategy (few and highly specialized areas with relatively large produc-
tion volumes), and not in a diversifying direction in alternative technol-
ogies (see Erixon 1997). The old, established ﬁrms have their comparative
advantage in the commercial implementation and marketing of large-scale
research projects, not in major breakthrough patents and innovations.
While neither R&D investments nor the number of resulting patents is nec-
essarily small, the endogenous eﬀect is that it perpetuates a development
path that leads to an even smaller and narrower base of highly specialized
ﬁrms that might not generate high growth and that may also be economi-
cally vulnerable due to shifts in technology. An interesting fact is that of
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more than 80 occurred in large ﬁrms (see Granstrand and Alänge 1995).
Through strong path dependency, the old, established, large-scale in-
dustrial structure is thus pushed to its limits by political and endogenous
economic decisions that determine the investment strategies and how they
are ﬁnanced. After 100 years of unprecedented growth (among the three
highest-growth countries ever recorded for a 100-year period), Sweden
ranked as one of the three wealthiest Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (OECD) countries in 1970. Due to lack of re-
siliency of the stale economic and political structures, as well as recurrent
and prolonged adjustment problems in the aftermath of the oil crises (six
devaluations), growth has been signiﬁcantly lower during the last thirty
years, and Sweden now ranks behind neighboring countries. The relation-
ships presented here between the characteristics of heavily entrenched cor-
porate control and growth provide a more plausible and direct explanation
of why the Swedish economy has shown signs of stagnation than the alter-
native theory that pinpoints the negative eﬀects of higher taxes and of a
larger public sector (see Lindbeck 1997).28
9.4.2 Private Control Maintained by Increasing Separation 
of Votes from Capital, Which Makes the Capital Base Too 
Small and Increases Agency Costs and Ineﬃciencies
When the increased international competitive pressure in the 1960s and
1970s forced highly leveraged Swedish ﬁrms to invest more, particularly in
R&D, and needed to ﬁnance takeovers and mergers to exploit scale ad-
vantages, the volume of SEOs increased considerably for the ﬁrst time since
the 1930s. Because of the strong preference for maintained control, the fre-
quency of listed ﬁrms that use dual-class shares increased signiﬁcantly,
from 18 percent in 1950 to 32 percent in 1968, to 54 percent in 1981, and
peaked at around 80 percent in 1992 to settle at 63 percent in 1998 and be-
low 60 percent after the IT bubble burst (see Agnblad et al. 2001; Holmén
and Högfeldt 2004a; and Henreksson and Jakobsson 2003a,b).29 The high
frequency of dual-class shares to separate votes from capital is thus a fairly
recent phenomenon and most prevalent among family-controlled ﬁrms
(see Agnblad et al.). This development has received political support since
ﬁrms with well-deﬁned private owners in control are believed to be more
eﬃcient; families have a long-term commitment, as the growth of private
fortune is tied to the ﬁrm’s development. In the 1980s and particularly af-
ter 1993, when all restrictions on foreign ownership of shares were abol-
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28. It is ironic that since 1997, when Lindbeck presented his dire and one-sided predictions
about the future development of the Swedish economy, the macroeconomic performance and
growth have at least equaled if not surpassed that of comparable EU countries.
29. In 1950 only 18% of 100 largest ﬁrms used dual-class shares: 29% in 1963; and 42% in
1978.ished, the political ambition (sometimes explicit but most often implicit)
has been to promote maintained control in order to keep corporate head-
quarters—speciﬁcally R&D, marketing, and strategic functions—in Swe-
den. This illustrates the political foundation and sensitivity of corporate
control in Sweden. The political support for extensive use of dual-class
shares and pyramiding is traded oﬀ against the indirect (direct) promise
that the largest ﬁrms continue to invest in Sweden and do not migrate.
Dual-class shares and pyramiding are in fact the very cornerstones of the
Social Democratic model of corporate ownership.30
Despite much larger foreign ownership (35 percent of outstanding
shares), almost exclusively via B-shares, and much more institutional own-
ership, the old families and closed-end investment funds have been able to
maintain a somewhat diluted control by increasing use of dual-class shares
combined with reinforced protection of incumbent owners via mandatory
bid rules and more stringent takeover rules that de facto increase en-
trenchment. However, in very large international mergers motivated by
scale eﬀects and very large R&D costs, the separation of votes and capital
has not been enough to maintain control; Investor lost control of Stora
(pulp and paper) and Astra (pharmaceuticals) in mergers with Enso and
Zeneca, and earlier it lost control of ASEA in a merger with Brown
Boveri—ABB. Despite some dilution of control and much larger capital
needs, it is remarkable that established families and closed-end funds are
still very often in control. But the increased separation between votes and
capital undercuts the very justiﬁcation for capitalistic ﬁrms, as a small cap-
ital contribution generates control over all other investors’ capital, in par-
ticular as the vote lever is often justiﬁed on historical grounds. The system
therefore also becomes more politically vulnerable, as, for example, the re-
cent EU initiative to abolish dual-class shares shows.
The strong separation between votes and capital generates two principal
types of costs that are primarily borne by the noncontrolling sharehold-
ers: costs due to extraction of pecuniary beneﬁts (self-dealing) by the con-
trolling owners, and agency costs due to bad (ineﬃcient) decision mak-
ing. Since the corporate law is designed to handle the problems with self-
dealing, and legal enforcement as well as tax enforcement is stringent,
agency costs are the most likely reason behind the discounts on ﬁrms with
leveraged control structure (see Roe 2002a). For example, Holmén and
Högfeldt (2004b) did not ﬁnd any indication of tunneling (corporate steal-
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30. A public inquiry about voting rights stated explicitly that dual-class shares could be use-
ful to ascertain that “Swedish ﬁrms remain controlled by Swedish interests” (see SOU
1986:23). More recently, the ﬁght against EU proposals to in eﬀect abolish the use of dual-
class shares has been spearheaded by the Wallenberg family via Investor, whose shareholders
paid for the campaign. The Social Democratic government announced that it would do every-
thing within its power to back the Wallenbergs and ﬁght the proposal. The right to use dual-
class shares is declared to be a national interest. If dual-class shares were prohibited in the fu-
ture, it is very likely that the Swedish model as we know it would disintegrate.ing) in Swedish pyramids that have the most leveraged control structures.
Moreover, the increased use of dual-class shares to maintain control im-
plies that the capital base for control becomes smaller: that is, the leverage
eﬀect in votes increases, which tends to increase the agency costs as the
diﬀerence between the power to make pivotal decisions and the private
value at risk for controlling owners increases. This eﬀect is ampliﬁed by the
lock-in of control for generations by the same family. In Schumpeterian
spirit, such dynamic agency costs can be substantial, as the entrepreneur-
ial genes and drive do not replicate easily; see Holmén and Högfeldt
(2004a). The discounts on family-controlled ﬁrms thus most likely gauge
such agency costs due to misallocation of control rights to heirs who make
ineﬃcient decisions, due, for example, to signiﬁcantly lower returns on in-
vestments ﬁnanced via retained earnings (see Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003
and Villalonga and Amit 2004).
The importance of agency costs due to a signiﬁcant lock-in of control
over the largest ﬁrms for a very long time can best be illustrated by the very
large discounts on CEIFs, the pyramid holding companies; see Holmén
and Högfeldt (2004b). The vote lever is particularly large since Swedish
funds combine separation via pyramiding and dual-class shares, which
generates a multiplicative eﬀect. Since Investor has a voting diﬀerential of
1:10, while Ericsson was the only listed ﬁrm on the SSE (until 2004) that
had a 1:1000 diﬀerential, the multiplier for the ownership of the Wallen-
berg family in Ericsson is 125—their own contribution is only about 0.8
percent of Ericsson’s capital while they control over 80 percent of the votes
jointly with Industrivärden. After the reform, the two major owners con-
trolled around 40 percent of the votes.
Figure 9.6 shows that the discount on Investor’s share price relative to
the fund’s net asset value from 1930 to 2002 has been substantial (averag-
ing about 30 percent), in particular in the 1970s, when it was around 40 per-
cent. After being cut to almost 20 percent in the early 1990s, the discount
is now back at around 35 percent. In addition, the portfolio ﬁrms have a 10
percent discount due to being under pyramidal control. Analyzing all
CEIFs, Holmén and Högfeldt (2004b) ﬁnd that the discount increases
linearly with the controlling owner’s degree of separation between votes
and capital in the fund and with the number of years the present owner
has been in control. The discount is thus signiﬁcantly higher for founder-
controlled pyramids: that is, it gauges the cost of pyramidal power as it be-
comes more leveraged and more entrenched. The results are consistent
with controlling owners’ becoming more dependent on the multiplicative
separation between votes and capital over time. Pyramidal separation is
thus not a static phenomenon, since the use of dual-class shares is intensi-
ﬁed in order to maintain control.
The discounts are primarily explained by dynamic agency costs (ineﬃ-
cient decisions) associated with the heavily entrenched power. For ex-
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folio management generates a return that is signiﬁcantly below their cost
of capital when capital gains are reinvested instead of being distributed. In
particular, a passive portfolio management by just holding the portfolio
generates a signiﬁcantly higher return than actively managing it according
to the pivotal owners’ speciﬁc interests. This in eﬀect limits their invest-
ments to projects in which they have a controlling interest, which in turn
often implies that bad projects are supported too long; the soft return re-
quirements on retained earnings reinforce these eﬀects. The lower returns
translate to into a loss (outﬂow) in the shareholders’ return stream from
the investment.
A standard neoclassical model predicts that the discount is simply the
ratio of the capitalized value of the outﬂow, which does not go to the
CEIF’s shareholders, to the total value of all outﬂows from the CEIF (i.e.,
including the dividends going to the shareholders; see Ross 2002). Holmén
and Högfeldt’s (2004b) empirical estimate of this theoretical ratio—the
fraction of all outﬂows that does not go to the shareholders—gives a dis-
count of 25.3 percent compared to the actual average discount of 26 per-
cent. The size of the agency costs is on average 0.7 percent of the CEIF’s
portfolio value, and increases with separation between votes and capital in
the CEIF. Since the size of the discount is directly linked to the control
structure and power of the controlling owners, the model in eﬀect explains
the large discounts in Sweden and provides a solution to the closed-end fund
puzzle.
Shareholders are in principle privately compensated for the costs of py-
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Fig. 9.6 Discount (%) on Investor 1930–2002: Share price relative to net asset 
value (NAV)
Sources:For 1930–91, Lindgren (1994, pp. 93, 149, 177, and 255), and for 1992–2002 Holmén
and Högfeldt (2004b).ramidal ownership through the discounts, but pyramiding also has a neg-
ative impact on the eﬃciency of the capital allocation in the economy that
is probably signiﬁcantly larger. Almeida and Wolfenzon (2004) have de-
veloped an interesting model of the equilibrium allocation of capital when
the comparative advantage of capital markets in reallocating capital, espe-
cially in time of change, is not at work. They show that the overall eﬃciency
may decrease in the presence of conglomerates, even when capital is allo-
cated eﬃciently within the conglomerate. The reason is that local eﬃciency
within a subset of ﬁrms does not correspond to global eﬃciency, as capital
is not eﬃciently allocated between all ﬁrms.
Unlike with conglomerates, the problem with pyramidal control is not
ineﬃcient internal capital markets, since no direct capital transfers be-
tween pyramid ﬁrms are possible. The major problem is instead that too
much capital is locked into the separate ﬁrms within the pyramid and not
redistributed, since the highly leveraged control structure causes an en-
hanced (political) pecking order because external capital is signiﬁcantly
more expensive than internal capital.31 Firms controlled by pyramids are
thus likely to be overcapitalized by relatively cheap internal capital, which
may lead to overinvestment, particularly in ﬁxed assets (PPE) and R&D,
and lower returns than required by the market (cost of capital). Pyramids
may thus have a strategic negative impact on corporate ﬁnancing and in-
vestments because of their limited dependence on the primary equity mar-
kets and because they retain too much earnings in ﬁrms that are primarily
in mature industries.32 Since not enough of the old capital (for control rea-
sons) is reallocated via the external equity markets to (for example) ﬂedg-
ling ﬁrms in new, growing industries, pyramiding hampers both the devel-
opment of ﬁnancial markets and the overall growth. These negative eﬀects
may be particularly signiﬁcant in Sweden since the pyramids have had
strategic control over the largest and oldest listed ﬁrms for decades.
9.4.3 Preference for Maintained Control, Which Implies Limited Use of
Equity Financing and That Too Few Firms Grow to Become Large
Egalitarianism may be conducive to dynamic changes, as is evident from
the labor market policies that were designed to promote mobility and struc-
tural changes in more socially acceptable forms. But when the objective to
promote or contain a less dispersed distribution of wealth disfavors equity
ﬁnancing in general, and, in particular, limits the possibilities for newly
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31. Unlike the discount on conglomerates, the large discount on pyramid holding compa-
nies cannot be explained by ineﬃciencies in the portfolio ﬁrms since this is already reﬂected
in the value of the holding ﬁrm’s portfolio.
32. The reason why pyramids exist is profoundly political; see Morck (2003) and Holmén
and Högfeldt (2004b). However, their structure is not primarily explained by the controlling
owners’ desire to exert power as such but to get control over a large and relatively cheap source
of ﬁnancing, or control over very large cash ﬂows via a small but strategic investment; see
Holmén and Högfeldt (2004b).founded ﬁrms to grow fast using equity ﬁnancing, there exists a conﬂict be-
tween egalitarianism and dynamic growth. The opportunities for entrepre-
neurs to build private fortunes by developing new ﬁrms have been limited
because of tax reasons but also since the strong preference for maintained
control in eﬀect limits the volume of equity ﬁnancing and, in particular, the
use of public oﬀers. This preference might be primarily a cultural trait but
is more likely to be an equilibrium outcome that is endogenously generated
by the corporate ownership model reinforced by the design of the tax sys-
tem—that is, by the enhanced political pecking order of ﬁnancing. The
preference for control implies limited use of equity ﬁnancing because it dis-
perses ownership and slow growth rate since the capital infusions are rela-
tively small—too few ﬁrms grow quickly to become large. The political dis-
favoring of equity ﬁnancing and favoring of retained earnings and loans
have reinforced this eﬀect. Hence, there are eﬀects both on the demand and
on the supply side that limit equity ﬁnancing in equilibrium.
In line with the pecking order theory of SEOs, the largest oﬀers for IPO
ﬁrms are rights issues that dilute control the least (see Holmén and Hög-
feldt 2004b). However, they are still too small to generate a high growth
rate for newly listed ﬁrms controlled by the founding entrepreneur. In gen-
eral, family-controlled IPO ﬁrms are undercapitalized because of the pref-
erence for control. The strong preference for maintained control and use
of retained earnings as the preferred method of ﬁnancing also limits the
growth rate of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). For a sample
of 1,248 ﬁrms with ﬁve to forty-nine employees, Wiklund, Davidsson, and
Delmar (2003) report that entrepreneur’s prioritize growth only if they do
not lose control and independence of other stakeholders while the well-
being of their employees is not compromised. They strongly prefer ﬁnanc-
ing via retained earnings even if they are aware that the ﬁrm will follow a
trajectory with lower growth than with equity ﬁnancing. Forty-four per-
cent say that they would rather sell the whole ﬁrm than share control even
if it would improve performance and growth. Moreover, ﬁrms where the
founder’s family owns a smaller fraction and/or have more ownership cat-
egories are more likely to grow faster.
Since the formation of new ﬁrms has been relatively low and decreasing
until the mid-1990s, the addition of new ﬁrms that grow quickly has been
limited. Together with the limited use of equity ﬁnancing to support fast-
growing ﬁrms, this implies a skewed size and age distribution of ﬁrms with
negative eﬀects on future growth. The incapacity to use equity ﬁnancing to
promote the growth of new ﬁrms in advancing industries may be the real
Achilles’ heel of the Swedish model.
9.4.4 A Summary: An Integrated Answer
An integrated, general answer to the three questions about how corpo-
rate ownership developed in Sweden, why the Social Democrats accepted
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why ownership did not separate widely in Sweden is structured as follows.
The Swedish corporate ownership model is built on a basic understand-
ing between the Social Democrats (labor) and capital: political support
and legitimacy of heavy entrenched private ownership is traded oﬀ against
the implicit guarantee that the largest listed ﬁrms do not migrate and that
they continue to invest. The strong separation of ownership and control
causes an enhanced (political) pecking order of ﬁnancing that is endoge-
nously supported by the interests of the two incumbencies.
The incumbent capital’s strong preference for maintained control of
listed ﬁrms implies a priority for ﬁnancing via retained earnings and
loans, and only limited use of equity ﬁnancing when needed, since this
would disperse ownership and eventually control, in particular if public
oﬀers are used. For diﬀerent reasons, the political ordering of ﬁnancing
alternatives by the Social Democrats was the same. The ideological focus
on the largest listed ﬁrms and their investments combined with skepticism
toward equity markets in general, and the primary markets in particular
for egalitarian reasons, implied a strong preference for retained earnings
and loans. The existing strongly relation-based banking system supported
this ordering, and so did the explicit political support for use of devices to
separate votes from capital via pyramids and speciﬁcally for dual-class
shares when the ﬁrms needed more equity ﬁnancing. As the incumbent
capital became more institutionalized, while creation of large private for-
tunes in new ﬁrms via signiﬁcant equity ﬁnancing is limited and does not
threaten to disperse the distribution of wealth too much, the order was
also politically acceptable. It is worth emphasizing that this line of argu-
ment pinpoints the political sensitivity of the equity markets’ primary
function and not their secondary function to provide liquidity, which is
more standard.
The resulting equilibrium perpetuates and reinforces the initially con-
centrated ownership of the largest listed ﬁrms since ownership does not
have to disperse because of signiﬁcant need for equity ﬁnancing—owner-
ship becomes more entrenched as separation of votes and capital increases
over time. Since historical proﬁts determine future investments and not ex-
pected future proﬁts, the equilibrium entails a strong path dependency:
dominance of very large and old ﬁrms in mature industries that tend to
overinvest while there are relatively few new and fast-growing ﬁrms in ad-
vancing lines of business. Since the labor market policies promote tenure
with the existing employer, both labor and corporate control are locked in
with the existing ﬁrms. The old industrial structure is thus taken to its lim-
its by the strong path dependency of corporate control, investments, labor,
and political power. The almost innate entrenchment of both the political
and the corporate powers breeds economic stagnation as well as lack of so-
cial dynamics.
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historical path?
The purpose of this section is to very brieﬂy outline some general factors
and the correlations between them that have been particularly important
determinants of the development of corporate ownership in Sweden. My
conjectures are of course subjective, very speculative, and incomplete, as I
focus on the overall picture from a speciﬁc ﬁnancial perspective, but the in-
stitutional and political stability makes it perhaps both easier and at the
same time more interesting to outline a hypothetical answer. I conjecture
that the following causal chain between some of these categories (factors)
has been particularly important.33
When Sweden started its modern economic development about 150
years ago, the country was relatively well endowed with natural resources
(e.g., minerals, forests, and water power), mainly located in the northern
part of the country, but large capital investments were needed to fully ex-
ploit the endowments. The lack of domestic capital and of a suﬃciently
large group of wealthy people left two alternative ways to raise the neces-
sary capital: collection of many people’s small savings via a domestic sys-
tem of saving and deposit banks and borrowing via the issuing of bond
loans abroad (perhaps also the migration of wealthy persons and entrepre-
neurs). The very large emigration wave to North America increased the po-
litical pressure to modernize the very poor country. The reasons behind the
country’s poverty and the question of what to do about it were the major
political issues. How to organize an eﬃcient banking system and how to re-
formit as the ﬁnancing demands changed were hotly debated questions for
many decades. Political reforms paved the way for a banking system of
Scottish type, and very large bond loans to ﬁnance infrastructural invest-
ments were sold to French and German but also to English investors.
Economic geography is very important since the country is located on the
northern rim of Europe but has a very long costal line. Since the Hanseatic
times, Sweden has been connected with Continental Europe and partly in-
tegrated via the Baltic Sea, but also connected with the British Isles, Am-
sterdam, and Hamburg via the North Sea, and later also part of a North At-
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33. In general, I think (without explicitly motivating it here) that an empirically relevant
theory of the historical development of corporate ownership and its importance for ﬁnancial
development and growth should consider (at least) seven broad categories: (a) endowments
(natural resources, geography, and population) and production technologies; (b) level and
distribution of wealth (poverty); (c) openness of society (transparency and competitiveness);
(d) legal system and enforcement; (e) political system (ideology, electoral system, tax system);
(f) structure of ﬁnancial system (relation based—arm’s length); and (g) major “random”
events (e.g., wars and the Great Reversal). The order is convenient and does not reﬂect the
categories’ relative importance. The two literatures on ﬁnance and growth (see, e.g., Beck,
Levine, and Loayza 2000 and Carlin and Mayer 2003) and on the political economy of cor-
porate ﬁnance (see, e.g., Pagano and Volpin 2001) have identiﬁed speciﬁc factors crucial for
ﬁnancial development, but it would take me too far astray to discuss them now.lantic economy after the great emigration. The export of raw materials had
gone on for centuries, which developed an awareness of being part of an in-
ternational market economy and fostered market discipline. Financial
transfers had also been crucial; for example, Sweden’s wars were ﬁnanced
out of Hamburg and Amsterdam. Trade credits and short-term borrowing
were later used eﬃciently as they de facto became long-term capital. As
people migrated to develop their know-how and skills abroad, cultural val-
ues, ideas, technological knowledge, and market knowledge were trans-
ferred to Sweden when they returned. Because it is a small country, the na-
tional culture is the cumulative result of inﬂuences from several diﬀerent
cultures. Despite an underdeveloped civic society, the country was thus rel-
atively open; the tensions within the elites were between the international
modernity and the parochial Swedish traditionalism. The longtime inter-
national integration into a larger market economy provided the necessary
basis for the late but fast and successful industrialization of Sweden. The
early formation of several new ﬁrms based on breakthrough innovations
that are still important today would probably not have taken place if the en-
gineers and entrepreneurs had not traveled and been internationally con-
nected and if the basic skills and training had not already been in place via
the long experience of export-oriented production.
When the capital demands for large-scale industrial investments in-
creased about 100 years ago, the ﬁnancial system could in principle have
developed into a market-based system of equity and bond ﬁnancing, but
the political power of the commercial banks, combined with support from
the Social Democrats, instead extended the intermediated system into eq-
uity ﬁnancing by the banking law of 1911 that permitted banks to operate
as investment banks and directly own equity. The ﬂedgling stock market
was too speculative to become an alternative source of outside ﬁnancing.
The relatively large equity issues in the 1910s and 1920s were primarily ﬁ-
nanced by the leveraged issuing companies controlled by banks at very
short arm’s length, and not via public oﬀers.
Without the bank law of 1911 it is likely that corporate ownership would
have developed quite diﬀerently; the law was the pivotal reason banks
ended up holding large equity portfolios of very ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms
in the early 1930s. When the new bank law of 1934 prohibited banks to di-
rectly own equity, they were allowed to transfer them to closed-end invest-
ment funds instead of being forced to sooner or later sell these assets back
to the market when prices rebounded. The leading banks could thus con-
tinue to exert control over the largest listed ﬁrms, even if it formerly was at
arm’s length. Unlike in the United States, the banks were not the problem
in Sweden but the solution to the problem of how to create ﬁnancial and
social stability and to restructure the large industrials. The main banks
were ﬁnancially healthy enough, were experienced as investment bankers,
and had developed the political contacts.
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the future developments through a strong political and regulatory path de-
pendency. This large random event, however, had an even larger impact in
Sweden, as the crises were the start of both the political hegemony of the
Social Democrats and the political model of entrenched corporate owner-
ship with the banks as the pivotal nodes for corporate control; ﬁnancial in-
termediation was de facto extended into highly leveraged corporate control
via pyramiding. A short-term and acute solution to the poorly functioning
ﬁnancial markets was extended for decades through the political hege-
mony and the basic understanding between labor and capital. Corporate
ownership is thus very political indeed.
In the early 1980s when deregulation of ﬁnancial markets started and
stock markets were reactivated, the increased use of dual-class shares was
backed by strong political support. The B-shares provided the necessary
liquidity and dispersion of ownership (capital) while the control rested
ﬁrmly with the traditional private owners, who increased their separation
between control and ownership when market values and capital demands
increased. Because of the control structure, the primary market for equity
did not develop fully, and the system in eﬀect continued to be very de-
pendent on intermediated ﬁnancing and retained earnings (a reactive ﬁ-
nancing mode) even though the tensions between ownership and control
were growing and attracting attention from politicians who would reform
the system.
I thus think it is possible to identify a simple causal chain that explains
why the Swedish ﬁnancial system has not developed into a fully market-
based ﬁnancial system with very active primary markets and dispersed cor-
porate ownership. Given the poverty and lack of wealthy individuals, and
the use of relatively capital-intensive technologies and large-scale produc-
tion, a system of intermediated ﬁnancing was politically chosen to collect
and allocate the capital. The deﬁning moments for the developments of the
ﬁnancial system are 1911, 1934–37, and 1984, when the intermediated sys-
tem was extended into equity ﬁnancing (banks were allowed to directly
own shares), when banks became the pivotal controlling owners of the
largest ﬁrms, and when the equity markets were reactivated (the Great Re-
versal was reversed) but the heavily entrenched control structure was main-
tained and reinforced by increased use of dual-class shares, respectively. At
these three turning points the development of the ﬁnancial system as well
as of corporate ownership and control could have followed other paths if
the political decisions had been diﬀerent. Because of the strong path de-
pendency in an intermediated ﬁnancial system when it is supported by po-
litical powers united by common interests, a genuinely market-based ﬁ-
nancial system has not developed in Sweden.
However, it is almost impossible to underestimate the persistent eﬀects
even today of the major random event: the crises in the early 1930s that
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and the very strong and growing entrenchment of private corporate con-
trol. Even if these two phenomena are not always analyzed as being
causally connected, it is almost inevitable not to regard them as Siamese
twins in an analysis of the development of corporate ownership in Sweden,
as I have done in this paper.
9.6 Conclusions
One hundred years ago modernity in Sweden was spearheaded by the
rapidly advancing industrial sector and carried by its two new social
groups—capital and labor—which reshaped the economic, political, and
social arenas. A relatively small group of leading industrialists and bankers,
most often recruited outside the establishment, represented the commercial
interests, had a pronounced Anglo-Saxon orientation, and were politically
active with a stress on rational reforms to promote changes. The well-
organized labor movement (SAP and LO) transformed its more radical,
original revolutionary objectives into a reformist agenda pursued by demo-
cratic, parliamentary means, and viewed itself as the carrier of future social
and economic changes of historical proportions. Despite signiﬁcant ideo-
logical inﬂuence from Germany, the leadership was primarily stimulated by
ideas from the British labor movement that could be implemented politi-
cally. Even though labor and capital had adversarial interests, they shared a
common sense of being harbingers of modernity. Together with the Liberal
Party, the Social Democrats successfully fought for general and equal suf-
frage (implemented in 1921) against the Old Right, which was organized
around the (autocratic) king and supported by the nobility, the church, the
military, the leading civil servants, and the large farmers. The Right had by
tradition looked toward Germany for guidance and emphasized social and
cultural values embodied in strong Lutheranism, nationalism, and tradi-
tionalism, with support for the monarchy and social order, mixed with dis-
dain for the commercial Anglo-Saxon countries and their (lack of) values.
Unlike in Germany, where the Old Right was fueled by revenge after
WWI and where the transition to modernity was violent, resulting in the
direst consequences for Europe, the transition in Sweden was peaceful de-
spite the weak governments and economic crises of the 1920s and early
1930s. In 1932 the Social Democratic vision of the Good Home (Folkhem-
met) was not only the political answer to the turbulent economic and po-
litical times with its focus on full employment policies but also represented
the democratic modernity, with strong emphasis on egalitarian values and
encompassing policies based on social and economic rationality with a
(benevolent) paternalistic ﬂavor mixed with some mild nationalism. To im-
plement the vision of the good society, the economic policies promoted
growth and full employment, particularly in the postwar period until the
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orate welfare state and in the political hegemony of the Social Democrats,
it is the most successful and long-lived political vision ever in a democracy.
But when the industrial society reached its peak in the mid-1970s, and
forty years of strong growth turned into almost thirty years of relative stag-
nation, recurrent economic, ﬁnancial, and budget deﬁcit crises, and signif-
icant loss of economic welfare, the weaknesses became all too apparent:
the lack of resilience of a too-small base of very large, old, and highly spe-
cialized ﬁrms in stagnating industries and lack of new growing ﬁrms in ad-
vancing industries. On ideological grounds the Social Democrats focused
on the largest listed ﬁrms, in particular their investments and R&D spend-
ing, and promoted policies that supported ﬁnancing via retained earnings
and borrowing from a strongly relation-based banking system but dis-
favored equity markets as suppliers of capital for egalitarian reasons. Their
political support for use of dual-class shares and pyramiding in eﬀect
aligned the interests of the incumbent political power with incumbent cap-
ital (in particular the leading banks) as corporate control is maintained
and actually reinforced. Capital is locked in with the incumbent ﬁrms since
the separation of control from ownership drives a wedge between the costs
of internal and external capital that causes an enhanced (political) pecking
order of corporate ﬁnancing. Investments are thus primarily determined
by historical proﬁts, not by expected future proﬁts.
Listed ﬁrms have indeed not been dependent on the primary equity mar-
kets, while the formation of private fortunes tied to new, fast-growing ﬁrms
fueled by equity market ﬁnancing has been very limited. This explains both
why ownership did not disperse and why the addition of new ﬁrms has been
so poor. Since labor market rules are designed to protect incumbent work-
ers, both labor and control over capital are therefore locked into the ex-
isting corporate structure while the Social Democrats have locked in the
political sector. The real problem with the Swedish model of corporate
ownership is thus the lack of economic and social dynamics—modernity
has become stale and embedded.
The strong historical and political path dependency is apparent in the
fact that the two socioeconomic groups that spearheaded modernity 100
years ago—leading capitalists and organized labor—are still the heavily
entrenched incumbencies even if the importance of the industrial society
has been declining for decades.34 The real irony is that corporate control,
although diluted in recent years by increased institutional ownership, is
still in the hands of a very few well-established families and banks, not de-
spite but because of Social Democratic policies.
The Social Democrats in eﬀect became the guarantor of heavily en-
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34. Path dependency is here used in a wider, more general sense than in, e.g., Bebchuk and
Roe (1999).trenched private corporate ownership rather than the terminator of capi-
talism, since the political and corporate incumbencies have been united by
strong common interests. Incumbent owners need the political support to
legitimize that their corporate power rests on extensive use of dual-class
shares and pyramiding. At the same time, the Social Democrats only get
the necessary resources and indirect support for their social and economic
policies from the private sector if the largest ﬁrms remain under Swedish
control so that capital does not migrate. By not encouraging outsiders to
create new ﬁrms and fortunes, and by not fully activating the primary eq-
uity markets, the heavy politicized system has redistributed incomes but
not property rights and wealth. The result is an aging economic system
with an unusually large proportion of very old and very large ﬁrms with
well-deﬁned owners in control.
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Comment Ailsa Röell
What makes Peter Högfeldt’s analysis of Swedish corporate ownership
particularly compelling is its focus on how politics has shaped the Swedish
corporate ﬁnance landscape. The paper sweeps through the twentieth cen-
tury, interrelating political change and developments in ﬁnancial institu-
tions, and providing a theoretical perspective.
From the viewpoint of an observer of the Dutch situation, I am struck
by the question of how two such similar countries as Sweden and the
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Princeton University.Netherlands could have developed in such a divergent way. Both are small,
open economies with a fairly homogeneous population that industrialized
relatively late; both use proportional voting; and both developed into so-
cial democracies with a strong emphasis on social cohesion, consensus,
and corporatist economic management in the second half of the twentieth
century. In both cases, the unions traded wage moderation in the postwar
expansion for a series of reforms in the 1970s designed to protect job secu-
rity and worker rights. In both cases, the corporatist compromise meant
that shareholder value maximization could not be the sole business objec-
tive. But it is fair to say that in both countries, workers did not achieve real
power over corporate decision making. Yet at the same time, shareholder
voice was signiﬁcantly curtailed.
It is here that the two countries diﬀer dramatically: in the manner in
which ownership and control were separated. In Sweden the widespread
use of dual-class shares, combined with a set of powerful bank-controlled
investment trusts inherited from the reforms of the 1930s, enabled a tiny set
of inﬂuential players to enduringly control much of Swedish industry. In
the Netherlands, the French-origin corporate law did not permit the use of
dual-class or nonvoting shares (and indeed, until the 1920s, it imposed vot-
ing caps on large stakes); moreover, the commercial banks had never
played a large role in long-term ﬁnancing. Thus, the Swedish pyramidal
group structure did not take hold. Instead, power in the largest companies,
insofar as it was not already in the hands of controlling interests, was given
to self-perpetuating boards that represented neither shareholders nor em-
ployees.
The ﬂaws of the Dutch system are now manifest in a series of scandals
related to fraud, mismanagement, and excessive executive pay. Corporate
management, not formally accountable to any one constituency, is daily on
trial in the court of public opinion, not to mention in the real courts. Polit-
ical reforms are overdue and likely.
In Sweden the potential costs come in the form of misallocated capital,
ossiﬁcation, and reduced innovation, as well as higher consumer prices due
to the oligopolistic nature of the ownership structures. How high are these
costs, and to what extent has economic growth been impaired? Sweden has
fallen back from its enviable position in 1970, with the highest per capita
GDP in Europe, to seventh place in 2003 (at current exchange rates,
eleventh in terms of purchasing power parity!). The extent to which the in-
terplay of political imperatives and the corporate ownership structure is
responsible for this decline is a topic of ongoing debate to which the cur-
rent paper contributes fresh insights.
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